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Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other
than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible. This is a
fundamentally subversive doctrine.
- Milton Friedman'
INTRODUCTION
This "subversive doctrine" to which Friedman refers has been
adopted and codified by a number of states in the form of non-
shareholder constituency statutes. These statutes have expanded the
criteria that corporate directors may consider when reaching deci-
sions on behalf of the corporation and have often been adopted
along with legislation which attempts to regulate hostile tender
offers .
2
In Pennsylvania, for example, the board of directors or commit-
tees of the board may, in determining the best interests of the corpo-
ration, "consider the effects of any action [or decision] upon
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I M. FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1982).
2 A "tender offer" has been defined as:
[A]n offer to stockholders of a publicly owned corporation to exchange
their shares for cash or securities at a price above the quoted market
price.... [A cash tender offer] is an offer to an individual shareholder to
purchase that person's shares at a price well above the market price, but
which is open for a limited time only. Stock being easily replaceable by
other stock, the shareholders ordinarily will accept the offer... Mender
offers entail certain costs to bidders. They are riskier than the negotiated
purchase of a company because surprises often await the bidder....
Mhe hostile bidder flies blind, without an opportunity to learn about the
target from the inside.
L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ &J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POuCv 1052 (2d
ed. 1988).
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employees, upon suppliers and customers of the corporation, and
upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located .... ,, Similar to antitakeover statutes,4
these provisions allow corporate directors to consider additional fac-
tors when responding to hostile takeovers. The explicit purpose of
the statutes, however, appears to be the general protection of non-
shareholder constituencies ("stakeholders") who have "contractual"
or economic relationships with corporations.
Furthermore, the statutes chip away at the common-law fiduci-
ary duty model of corporate governance5 by allowing directors and
officers of corporations to weigh stakeholders' interests when mak-
ing major corporate decisions. The inherent "softness" of the word-
ing of the statutes creates a significant problem, however, as many
fail to name specific constituencies, and the ones that are specific do
not indicate what types of considerations or measures would fulfill
directors' responsibilities.
5
Stakeholders, nevertheless, are often affected negatively by
directors' decisions involving corporate restructurings, 7 mergers,
3 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon Supp. 1989). As of this writing,
Pennsylvania's legislature is in the process of considering what might amount to be
the nation's most rigorous antitakeover law. In addition to deterring corporate
raiders from running up target corporations' stock prices, the proposed bill allows
corporate directors to consider and weigh a broad variety of factors when making
decisions. The bill also includes a provision which requires anyone acquiring a
Pennsylvania corporation to honor all existing labor contracts. The bill was passed
by the Pennsylvania Senate and is under consideration in the House. The relevant
part of the fiduciary duty provision in the Senate bill states that directors may
consider the "effect of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action,
including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the
corporation and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located." In addition, "the board of directors . . . shall not be
required.., to regard any corporate interest or the interest of any particular group
affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor." S. 1310,
1989 Sess., § 511(b). For a closer examination of existing nonshareholder
constituency statutes, see infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text.
5 This fiduciary duty of directors in managing a corporation is usually divided
between a duty of care and duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.
See L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ &J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 591.
6 See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
7 A restructuring usually involves a corporation that has been the subject of a
tender offer. In response to a tender offer by a third party, the corporation "offers its
shareholders a package of debt or preferred stock and cash having a higher value
than the tender offer in exchange for a significantly reduced equity position." L.
SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 1131. Restructuring plans
often call for sales of whole divisions or some assets of the corporation in order to
service new debt. Id. Between January 1984 and mid-July 1985, 398 of the 850
largest North American corporations underwent restructurings. See Coffee,
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acquisitions, and liquidations.' These major corporate decisions
may impair investments that stakeholders have made in corporations
that have not been fully accounted for or protected through explicit
contracts.9 In addition, stakeholders may not possess the means nec-
essary to bargain with directors or officers in order to protect them-
selves against corporate decisions that may adversely affect their
investments and welfare.10
Employees constitute perhaps the most significant stakeholder
group. They are affected directly by practically all major corporate
decisions, particularly takeovers. Effects upon employees ripple out
to surrounding communities, which possess another stakeholder
interest.' For example, corporate restructurings that respond to
hostile takeover attempts often involve layoffs or employee termina-
tions.1 2 Employees may have invested a significant amount of "capi-
tal" in the corporation. Factors adding to employees' investment in
the corporation include: years of service, job education, community
contact, quality of life, and other nonpecuniary elements.' This
building or accumulating of "human capital"' 4 in the workplace may
not be reciprocated with contractual protection against adverse
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6
(1986).
8 Mergers, acquisitions, and liquidations may be a result of, or response to,
hostile tender offers. See CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT: CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ECONOMY AND CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE (Comm. Print 1987),
reprinted in L. SOLOMON, D. SCHwARTz &J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 1149, 1162-64
[hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEoVERS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS].
9 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 108.
10 See i. ("Managers and . . . other constituencies share the common
circumstances of a nondiversifiable investment in the corporation that makes them
risk averse.").
II Employee layoffs by corporations impact upon local communities by reducing
the demand for goods, services, and housing. Increased local unemployment rates
may effect local communities' ability to provide social and educational services as a
result of reductions in tax revenues. See CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 1162.
12 See id. at 1163 ("[I]t is clear that the recent wave of corporate restructurings-
characterized by the increased use of debt to repurchase common stock and boost
share prices-has prompted employee layoffs and other cost cutting measures....
[I]t is... a response to the need to boost common stock prices to thwart corporate
raiders.").
13 See Raday, Individual and Collective Dismissal-A Job Security Dichotomy, 10 COMP.
LAB. LJ. 121, 150 (1989); Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611,
717-20 (1988).
14 See Raday, supra note 13, at 152-55. See generally G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrAL
(2d ed. 1975) (discussing the theoretical and empirical bases of human capital).
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events. Individual employees usually do not have the means to pro-
tect themselves from either unforeseeable, or even foreseeable, risks
of wholesale job loss or loss of human capital investments in corpo-
rations.1 5 Compared with shareholders, employees may have less of
an ability to withdraw from the corporation and may ultimately hold
a larger stake in its future.16 Furthermore, unions have not been
able to protect workers effectively from collective terminations and
the risks of loss as a result of major corporate decisions.'
7
If nonshareholder constituency statutes are thought of as legis-
lative attempts to create entitlements for parties outside the standard
shareholder-manager (owner-agent) relationship,' 8 they may indeed
represent a form of wealth sharing or redistribution, encouraging
those who benefit from major corporate decisions (shareholders) to
compensate those who lose as a result of them (those who have a
stake, but no ownership). The statutes, therefore, may provide a
coherent framework in which directors might address the concerns
of employee stakeholders. Although it might be impossible or
impractical for state legislatures to decide how employees' interests
should be protected from the risks of takeovers or other major cor-
porate decisions such as plant closings, 20 it may be feasible for direc-
tors to provide adequate protection.
Directors may be able to use standard corporate contracts in
order to provide protection for employees. In fact, a series of con-
tracts have already been developed which might assist in compensat-
ing workers for increased risk sustained as a result of takeovers,
15 See Raday, supra note 13, at 128.
16 See Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and
Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. S. SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982); see, e.g., Passell, In
Takeovers, Play's the Thing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at D2, col. 1 (reviewing a new
play, Other People's Money, which tracks the emotional trauma of a hostile acquisition
on a small company and its employees); Baker, Human Factor Often Ignored; Mergers
Create Big Firms, Nightmares for Employees, L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1, col. 5
(interviewing employees who face an impending acquisition and outlining the
"human" and family-related costs experienced by these workers, especially their
inability to move to other jobs in other parts of the country).
17 See Raday, supra note 13, at 128.
18 See Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 447-51.
19 See, e.g., id. at 448 ("Even iC there is no net social loss, any wealth transfer here
is probably in an anti-egalitarian direction, because employees are losing as
shareholders gain."); Coffee, supta note 7, at 12 ("[P]redictably, there are affected
bystanders [to bust-up, hostile takeovers]-most notably, managers and employees,
but also creditors and ultimately the state as well-who will change their behavior as
the significance of the takeover's impact grows on them.").
20 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 108.
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restructurings, or other major corporate decisions: successorship
clauses, 2 1 "silver" or "tin" parachute agreements, 22 and employee
stock ownership plans.2' First, the incorporation of successorship
clauses into collective bargaining agreements may help surmount
some of the risks associated with collective (unionized) employee ter-
minations. Second, directors might offer silver or tin parachute
agreements, fashioned after currently used golden parachute agree-
ments, which would help to provide non-unionized employees with
direct or individual compensation for added risks from takeovers.
Finally, directors might adopt employee stock ownership plans in
order to provide added compensation and assist in the acquisition of
stock by workers.
Part I of this Comment examines the hostile takeover environ-
ment and the increasing use of antitakeover legislation by the states
to protect employees' and other stakeholders' interests. Part II takes
a closer look at nonshareholder constituency statutes and the
caselaw supporting consideration of stakeholders' interests. Part III
presents a contractual view of corporations and concludes that many
interests of employees are often not captured through typical con-
tracting processes. Part IV presents the successorship clause, silver
and tin parachute agreements, and employee stock ownership plan
as explicit contractual methods which directors might use in order to
account for employees' interests under nonshareholder constituency
statutes and thereby satisfy their duties. Part V briefly examines a
potential criticism of the use of these contracts: the problem of man-
agerial entrenchment.
I. THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER ENVIRONMENT: WINNERS, LOSERS &
REGULATION
Before the mid-1980s, the takeover landscape consisted mainly
of larger corporations digesting smaller firms for synergistic gains,
through neutral or friendly tender offers. 24 Subsequently, a new
breed of entrepreneur, including "corporate raiders" and leveraged
buyout firms, emerged and mastered the use of the tender offer.25
21 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
24 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 2.
25 In addition, investment banks also entered the scene as principal investors
and temporary lenders in transactions, no longer acting solely as advisors. See id. at
2-3. Investment banks have volunteered to purchase equity positions in many hostile
takeovers and have offered temporary ("bridge loan") acquisition financing. In this
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These "financial entrepreneurs" have generally targeted large con-
glomerate corporations as potential takeover candidates.2 6 Corpo-
rate raiders have been successful in arbitraging the difference
between stock and asset values of these conglomerates by initially
acquiring control and then partially liquidating the companies in
order to pay off acquisition indebtedness.2 7 Two modem develop-
ments have facilitated the increased number of corporate takeovers,
particularly hostile tender offers: the high-yield, non-investment
grade ("junk") bond2" and the highly-leveraged, bust-up takeover.2 9
type of financing, investment banks provide short-term acquisition funds to acquiring
companies that intend quickly to refinance the debt with permanent capital, funded
by bank loans, the sale of bonds or notes, or the sale of the target company's assets.
Bridge loans are often used in order to facilitate hostile tender offers. See Lipton,
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1987);
Penn, Raiding Parties: Friends and Relatives Hitch Their Wagon to Carl Ichan's Star, Wall
St.J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
26 In past years, conglomerates such as General Foods, Richardson-Vicks,
Beatrice, Revlon, SCM, CBS, and Anderson Clayton have been either forced to
restructure their operations or were acquired as result of hostile bids for control.
Takeover attempts for these giant companies were apparently motivated by the
perceived disparity between the target companies' liquidation and stock market
values. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 3-5; see also Splitting Up-The Other Side of Merger
Mania, Bus. WE., July 1, 1985, at 50, 50-54 (stating that "[clonglomerates have taken
the lead injettisoning assets. Their goal is to stay ahead of the raiders and get their
businesses in focus.... Having started squeezing down soon after their heyday in the
1960s, [conglomerates] are now leaping enthusiastically into the restructuring wave
and emerging as different animals").
In 1989 Kolhberg, Kravis & Roberts Co. completed the largest leveraged buyout
transaction in history by acquiring the conglomerate RJR Nabisco for approximately
25 billion dollars. See, e.g., Henry Kravis Turns Buyouts Into Empire Worth Billions; RJR
Nabisco Takeover Puts KKR at the Top, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 5 ("KKR
agreed to pay a record $25 billion to acquire RJR Nabisco Inc., the food and tobacco
giant. The takeover . . . will require an unprecedent $22.8 billion in borrowed
money."); RJR Nabisco Suiter Claims $24.88 Billion Victory, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at
Al, col. I (relating the same facts)-
27 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 3-5.
28 See L. SOLOMON, D. ScHwARTz &J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 1062 (defining a
"junk bond" as a "high yield, sometimes high risk, bond that is rated below
investment grade by the bond rating agencies. Junk bonds are not new, but their
application to takeovers is relatively recent"). These bonds are usually:
[P]urchased by a consortium of wealthy investors or by institutions who
finance the acquiring company's acquisition of the target, so that the
shares may be purchased for cash. The acquiring company then merges
with the target company, and by operation of law, the junk bonds issued
by the purchaser becomes [sic:] the obligations of the target.
Id.; see also R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONs 787 (3d ed. 1986) (similarly defining junk
bonds).
29 A bust-up takeover is one that results in the "reconstruction of the target
company by a sell-off of substantial assets or whole divisions. Often this is
necessitated to pay off part of the debt that was incurred to acquired the target." L.
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The threat of hostile tender offers, though, may induce manage-
ments of corporations to raise efficiency or facilitate inefficient man-
agements' removal.3 0 Changing technology, regulation, or market
conditions may require major restructuring of corporate assets in a
particular industry, and current managers may be ineffective in mak-
ing such changes. If stock prices incorporate all currently available
information on corporations and management, ineffective manage-
ment will be penalized in the marketplace."1 According to this the-
ory, takeovers create efficiencies by replacing inefficient or
entrenched managers; using debt to motivate organizational effi-
ciency; forcing managers to focus on free cash flow to the firm; creat-
ing value through facilitating the exit of excess or duplicate
resources; building synergy from combining resources and liquidat-
ing redundant parts; and reducing overcapacity by paying out large
amounts of excess capital to shareholders.3 2 Taken one step further,
some scholars argue that society as a whole will benefit from the
shifting of resources from lower to higher value uses.s3 Sharehold-
ers' financial interests are thus thought to be congruent with soci-
SOLOMON, D. ScHwARTz &J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 1060. The era of junk-bond
financed, bust-up takeovers apparently began in 1984, when Drexel Burnham
Lambert arranged junk bond financing for Boone Pickens' bid for Gulf Oil
Corporation. According to Lipton:
By mid-1985, the flow of junk-financed takeovers had become "an
avalanche." . . . [W]hile bond issues represented only 0.3% of tender
offer financing for the years 1981 through 1984, one study concluded
that, in the first half of 1985, junk bonds accounted for 13.6% of all
successful tender offer financing and 24.7% of hostile tender offer
financing.
Lipton, supra note 25, at 11-12. (citations and footnotes omitted).
30 See, e.g., The Battle for Corporate Control Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at 102, 103
[hereinafter Battle for Corporate Control] (quoting Richard M. Schlefer, Investment
Manager of College Retirement Equities Fund: "We view tender offers as a kind of
free, competitive market for management. The best managers will end up running a
company.").
31 SeeJensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2J. EcoN. PERSP. 21, 23-25
(1988); see alsoJensen & Ruback, The Marketfor Corporate Controk The Scientific Evidence,
J. FIN. ECON., Apr. 1983, at 5, 8-9, 29-39 (noting that managerial actions that
eliminate potential bidders, such as targeted large-block repurchases or standstill
agreements, apparently are costly to shareholders and the marketplace generally);
Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 467,
472 (concluding that "[t]he wealth-enhancing view of takeovers is supported by the
fact that top managers lose their jobs when their firms are the subject of a successful
hostile takeover").
32 SeeJensen, supra note 31, at 23-39.
33 See id.
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ety's general interest in efficiency in production and in the capital
markets.34
While it has been accepted by most scholars that shareholders of
target corporations have been the primary winners in contests for
corporate control, 5 the effects of such contests upon managers,
employees, buyers and suppliers, and state and local communities
have been disputed.3 6 Restructurings of corporations in response to
34 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 11ARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174-80 (1981). See generally
Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus.
LAw. 1733, 1739-45 (1981) (noting that the "productive economic benefits" to
society and shareholders from tender offers cuts against arguments calling for
resistance and defensive tactics to takeover attempts).
35 Shareholders of companies caught in the midst of hostile takeovers can
expect to realize from 50 to 100 percent appreciation in value of their holdings. See
Coffee, Regulating the Marketfor Corporate Control: A CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1162-63 (1984). Target firm
shareholders often realize unprecedented appreciation and liquidity for their
investments. One scholar has computed the average premium paid to target firm
shareholders in a successful tender offer (based on the market price two months prior
to the offer's announcement) to be approximately 49 percent. See id. at 1162 n.34
(citing study by Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Contro 54J.
Bus. 345 (1980)). Cf Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 371, 373 (1980) (estimating that the
average cash tender offer premium had risen to almost 73 percent after a wave of state
antitakeover statutes; the percentage was calculated from the target's share price 40
days prior to the tender offer); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 31, at 7 (finding that
stock price gains of targets in successful tender offers averaged 30 percent, and in
successful mergers, averaged 20 percent).
Economists have recently attempted to place a dollar value on the overall gains
to shareholders from successful tender offers (and corresponding takeover)
transactions. Jensen has estimated that in the ten year period between 1976 and
1986 the gains to target firm shareholders from merger and acquisition activity
totalled 346 billion dollars (in 1986 dollars). See Jensen, supra note 31, at 21 (using
data from M. GRIMM, MERGERSTAT REVzEW (1986) for estimates). Such gains are
close to 51 percent of the total cash dividends (in 1986 dollars) paid to investors by
the entire corporate sector over the past ten years. See id.
36 See Brown & Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9, 9-31 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988); Grundfest
Challenges Argument That Takeovers CauseJob Losses, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 423
(1988); Jensen, supra note 31, at 22-24.
One scholar has concisely framed the economic aspects of this issue:
Thus the central question is whether the shareholders who are the big
winners are enjoying the premiums they do because bidders with better
ideas are willing to share the wealth (which is fine), or whether premiums
sometimes (or even often) are paid out of savings expected to be
generated by the acquirer's reneging on contracts with managers,
suppliers, customers, or employees (which may not be fine).
Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revisted, 88 MICH. L. REV. 120, 127 (1989).
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hostile tender offers often involve "major organizational change
(such as shifts in corporate strategy) to meet new competition or
market conditions, increased use of debt, and a flurry of recontract-
ing with managers, employees, suppliers and customers."37 This
type of activity results in the expansion of resources in certain areas
and retraction in others, leading to plant closings,"8 job termina-
tions, early or forced retirement of managers and employees, and
reduced compensation.
3 9
Perhaps one of the most pressing dilemmas confronting corpo-
rate directors and officers is the "identification of the appropriate
constituency to serve [when] evaluating a tender offer." 40 The
increasing use by officers of corporate defenses41 to hostile tender
37 Jensen, supra note 31, at 22.
38 See Singer, supra note 13, at 614-18.
39 See, e.g., Proxmire, What's Right and Wrong About Hostile Takeovers? 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 353, 360 (concluding that hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts "have led
directly to the elimination ofjobs" in the economy).
40 Note, Stakeholder Versus Stockholder: The Director's Proper Constituency in a Contest
for Corporate Control 15 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 475, 476 (1989). With these concerns
in mind, Hicks B. Waldron, then Chairman of Avon Products Inc., stated:
We have 40,000 employees and 1.3 million representatives around the
world. We have a number of suppliers, institutions, customers,
communities. None of them have the democratic freedom as shareholders
do to buy or sell their shares. They have much deeper and much more
important stakes in our company than our shareholders.
Battle for Corporate Control, supra note 30, at 103. This dilemma is a part of a broader
and much older debate concerning managers' representation of proper constituen-
cies and corporate social responsibility. See, e.g., Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Manag-
ers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (proposing to broaden the scope of
managers' role in representing constituencies other than shareholders). But see Berle,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365, 1367 (1932)
(objecting to Professor Dodd's broadening of managers' responsibilities).
41 Some prevalent corporate defenses which have been used by corporate
directors and managements throughout the 1980s include: instituting a "pac-man"
defense; restricting the voting rights of large stockholders; adopting share purchase
rights plans ("poison pills"), enabling rights-holders the opportunity to purchase
shares of an acquiror at half-price in the event a target is merged into an acquiring
company; paying greenmail to a corporate raider; liquidating a company; instituting
''crown jewel" or "lock-up" options in which the target conveys an option to a
favored acquiring company for purchase of especially valuable assets or stock;
negotiating a "defensive merger" by finding a "white knight" alternative (a less
hostile acquiror); negotiating a placement of a large block of stock into the friendly
hands of a third party (a "white squire"); or adopting a "shark repellent" provision in
the target company's articles of incorporation or by-laws that is designed to deter a
bidder's interest (some examples include: creating staggered board of director's
terms, requiring supermajority approval of a merger with a large shareholder, and
creating a "fair price" amendment). See R. GILSON, THE LAw AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE AcQ~UIsrrlONs 626-75 (1986); L. SOLOMON, D. ScHWARTZ &J. BAUMAN,
supra note 2, at 1059-65; Lipton, supra note 25, at 28-34.
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offers, along with the rising amount of state anti-takeover legislation,
has threatened a "fundamental postulate of modern corporation
law. . . .[that a] corporation exists for the financial benefit of its
shareholders [and] management must devote itself to this single pur-
pose with relentless fidelity."42 Institutional investors have vigor-
ously attacked the adoption and use of corporate defense tactics by
managers of large public corporations threatened by hostile bids.
These equity holders claim that defensive tactics have restricted the
choices of target shareholders and deny opportunities to realize
stock appreciation value through takeovers.43
It has become increasingly clear that the antitakeover statutes
adopted over the years among the states have been designed to pro-
tect the existing corporation and its nonshareholder constituen-
cies.44 Although state legislatures may have accepted in theory the
notion of centrality of shareholders' interests in corporate affairs and
42 Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 903, 903 (1988); see, e.g., Law, A Corporation is More than Its Stock, 64 HARv. Bus.
REV. 80, 83 (1986) ("It is undeniable that managers and employees have
responsibilities to shareholders. But is it also inconceivable that shareholders have
responsibilities to them?").
43 Institutional investors, including pension ftinds, mutual funds, banks, and
insurance companies, own a significant portion of equity of all publicly traded
corporations in the United States. See Upton, supra note 25, at 7. The Council of
Institutional Investors, an interest group with more than 50 pension fund members,
controlling 200 billion dollars worth of investments, adopted a "Shareholders Bill of
Rights" in April 1986, which demanded that shareholder approval be required for a
wide range of management actions. See, e.g., Battle for Corporate Control, supra note 30,
at 103 (reporting that the Council of Institutional Investors led a proxy fight against
antitakeover defense tactics in 40 shareholder meetings in the spring of 1988);
Lipton, supra note 25, at 28 (stating that "[t]hese tactics, which restrict the choices of
target shareholders and may be undesirable in the abstract, are currently legitimate
responses to abusive takeover schemes, such as the highly leveraged, asset-stripping
takeover").
44 On this point, Professors LymanJohnson and David Millon state that the goal
of antitakeover laws is "not to maximize share values for target company investors,
whether by eliminating coercion or otherwise, and no apology can alter that fact.
Instead, their chief purpose is to protect nonshareholders from the disruptive impact
of the corporate restructurings that are thought typically to result from hostile
takeovers." Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MicH.
L. REV. 846, 848 (1989); see also Millon, supra note 42, at 904 (stating that "[w]hile
state takeover legislation often pays lip service to shareholder welfare, such
legislation actually has a different purpose, a purpose fundamentally antithetical to
the shareholder primacy norm of present corporation law"). But see Booth, supra note
36, at 129 (suggesting that there might be hidden benefits to shareholders from
control share statutes even though the statutes may support some stakeholders'
interests); Booth, The Promise of Stat? Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635, 1681
(1988) (claiming that control share acquisition takeover statutes represent a
"remarkably intelligent approach to the problem of fairness in tender offers" and
may aid shareholders in realizing value through tender offers).
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may have observed the need to redress the imbalances in the rela-
tionship between managers and shareholders, "states also saw a dif-
ferent side of the rampant takeover activity-the social responsibility
side-and began to question whether attaining takeover benefits for
shareholders was as consistent with other important interests as eco-
nomic and legal orthodoxy presumed."45
State legislatures perceived that the major benefits of bust-up,
hostile takeovers would be primarily enjoyed by residents of many
states (i.e., dispersed shareholders), leaving the economic and social
costs of the transactions to fall disproportionately within the bounda-
ries of those states having substantial connections to the target com-
panies. They feared the costs of the "closing or moving of corporate
headquarters and plants," the loss of employment for in-state work-
ers, the "loss of income, property, and sales tax revenues . .. [the]
reduction of charitable contributions to dependent nonprofit organi-
zations, and [the losses] to the target [corporation's] web of suppli-
ers, dealers, and customers." 46
By 1982, under pressure from local constituencies and corpo-
rate managements, thirty-six states enacted antitakeover legislation,
often strengthening the disclosure requirements imposed by the Wil-
liams Act.47 These first-generation statutes have been followed over
the years by second- and third-generation statutes4" as legislatures
responded to successful legal attacks on their constitutionality.
49
45 Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target
Management Conduct, 14J. CORP. L. 35, 67 (1988).
46 Id
47 See L. SOLOMON, D. ScnwAuRz &J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 1088.
48 The current state antitakeover laws have been called "second-" and "third-
generation" laws. Second-generation laws were drafted by legislatures to avoid the
constitutional problems that caused the Supreme Court to invalidate "first-
generation" laws in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982). Third-
generation laws were passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Recently, the Supreme
Court refused to hear a challenge to Wisconsin's antitakeover law which requires a
bidder who acquires at least 10 percent of a target company's shares either to gain
approval of the target's board of directors or to wait three years before completing a
merger. It would appear by this decision that the Supreme Court has left the states
with substantial authority to regulate hostile tender offers. See Wermiel, Supreme Court
Declines to Review Law in Wisconsin Curbing Hostile Takeovers, Wall St.J., Nov. 7, 1989, at
B12, col. 5.
49 In general, antitakeover laws have been categorized as control-share
acquisition provisions, fair price provisions, redemption rights statutes, business
combination statutes, and nonshareholder constituency provisions. For a discussion
of the first four categories and their variations, seeJohnson, supra note 45, at 36 n.3,
61-88; Macey, supra note 31, at 468 n.4, 469-71; Romano, The Political Economy of
Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 11, 111-21 (1987).
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Much has been written on these antitakeover statutes and it is
beyond the scope of this Comment to address the issues raised by
them.50
II. ACCOUNTING FOR STAKEHOLDERS' INTERESTS
A. Leislative Efforts
Almost half of all states have adopted statutes which expand the
criteria that directors may look to in reaching decisions or exercising
their business judgment on behalf of the corporation.5" Ohio's stat-
50 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 42, at 903-05 (outlining many of the major
corporate law issues raised by the statutes); Romano, supra note 49, at 120-42
(examining the political motivations behind the statutes).
51 Although the statutes exist in several different forms, all relate to the
standard of care in which directors (and officers) must discharge their duties. The
statutes might be best characterized as follows: Best Interests Statutes-Statutes in
which states permit directors making corporate decisions to consider the long-term
as well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including
the possibility that these best interests might be served by the continued
independence of the corporation. Arizona and Connecticut actually require directors
to consider these interests; Speczc6 Constituencies-Statutes in which states permit
directors to consider only the immediate interests of the shareholders and specific
nonshareholder constituencies, including employees, bondholders, suppliers,
customers, communities or other groups, and the economy of state and nation; Mixed
Statutes-Statutes in which states permit or require consideration of the corporation's
best interests (long- and short-term) and permit consideration of specific
constituencies. Connecticut requires that directors consider the best interests of the
corporation along with the interests of shareholders and nonshareholder
constituencies when making decisions relating to a change of control.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1989) (best interests statute-
requiring directors to consider the "long-term as well as short-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp.
1989) (mixed statute requiring directors to consider best interest and constituencies in
a change of control); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111(9) (West Supp. 1990) (mixed); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1702 (Supp. 1989) (mixed); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989) (mixed and the statute extends to officers of the corporation); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns 1989 & Supp. 1989) (mixed); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271A.397(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (mixed); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1989) (specific constituencies and the statute extends to officers);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1990) (mixed); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (the statute only relates to a board's consideration
of an acquisition proposal and enumerates specific constituencies); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2035(1) (Supp. 1988) (mixed); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Supp. 1989)
(mixed); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990) (mixed statute for
directors' decisions including, without limitation, those which relate to a change of
control); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1988) (mixed); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (mixed); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.305 (West Supp. 1989) (mixed and extends to officers); see also Hanks,
Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and
Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1246-53 (1988) (appendix) (listing
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ute is representative of the statutes that allow directors to consider
the best interests of the corporation and the interests of specific non-
shareholder constituencies:
[A] director, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, shall consider the interests of
the corporation's shareholders and, in his discretion, may consider
any of the following:
(1) The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers,
creditors, and customers;
(2) The economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considerations;
(4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders, including the possibility that
these interests may be best served by the continued inde-
pendence of the corporation.
5 2
In all of the states, except Connecticut and Missouri, directors may
consider either the best interests of the corporation or stakeholders'
interests in connection with any decision submitted to them. Con-
necticut and Missouri have limited the application of their statutes to
acquisition proposals.53
Most of the statutes do enumerate specific groups54 that direc-
nonshareholder constituency statutes along with corresponding antitakeover
statutes).
52 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
53 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
54 Since antitakeover statutes are designed to prevent "high unemployment and
erosion of the State and local economy and tax base," see 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 124,
reprinted in Johnson & Millon, supra note 44, at 849, it is logical to assume that they
would be supported by a coalition of local interests, including labor and community
groups.
Apparently, this was found not to be the case in Connecticut. One scholar has
noted that the state's "second-generation" antitakeover statute was not generally
supported by broad coalitions of local interests, including labor and local community
groups, but was supported by one particular corporation. See Romano, supra note 49,
at 122-23. Professor Roberta Romano claims that:
The spur behind the passage of the Connecticut [second-generation
antitakeover] statute was not a broad-based political coalition. Rather, the
bill was promoted by a corporation incorporated in Connecticut, the
Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company . . . which enlisted the
support of the most important business association in the state, the
Connecticut Business and Industry Association ....
Iad
On the other hand, Wisconsin's experience in adopting antitakeover laws in
1987 was found to be consistent with a coalition theory in which state labor groups
and other non-business interest groups actively supported the legislation. See Davis,
1463
1464 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:1451
tors may consider. New York, for example, recently amended its
statute55 to allow directors to consider the short- and long-term
effects that their decisions may have upon the corporation's current
employees, retired employees, 56 customers, creditors, and ability "to
provide, as a going concern, goods, services, employment opportu-
nities and employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to the
communities in which it does business."'57 The groups most fre-
quently listed among all statutes are employees, 58 suppliers, custom-
ers,59 and local communities.6" None of the statutes, however,
provide a coherent framework to guide directors in satisfying their
duties to these constituencies. Thus, corporate directors are left to
determine the correct balances between the best interests of the
stockholders, the corporation, and other constituencies. Conflicting
interests frequently make this determination inherently difficult: in a
Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 491,
496-97. Even though nonshareholder interest groups such as organized labor or
municipalities may not be the actual sponsors of antitakeover legislation, they may
actively support it once it has been proposed. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 437 & n.8
(noting the current debate over the nature of the political coalition supporting
antitakeover legislation and arguing that the silence of labor groups and communities
may actually imply consent).
55 The New York statute enditles corporate directors "[i]n taking action ... to
consider, without limitation, (1) both long-term and short-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders and (2) the effects that the corporation's actions
may have in the short-term or in the long-term upon [enumerated constituencies]."
See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990) (amending 1989 version of
the statute).
56 The statute includes "retired employees and other beneficiaries receiving or
entitled to receive retirement, welfare or similar benefits from or pursuant to any
plan sponsored, or agreement entered into, by the corporation." Id.
57 Id. In addition to the above noted groups, the statute also allows directors to
consider "the prospect for potential growth, development, productivity and
profitability of the corporation." Id.
58 Employees are mentioned in all of the mixed and specific constituency
statutes and are always the first group to be listed in these statutes. See supra notes 51
& 52 and accompanying text.
59 Suppliers to and customers of the corporation are often mentioned together.
See id.
60 Several of the statutes limit consideration of community interests to those
areas in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located or to
where the corporation "conducts its business." See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
Other statutes have a broader scope. Kentucky, for example, allows directors to
consider the interests of the "economy of the state and nation [and] [c]ommunity and
societal considerations." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1988). Creditors are often not specifically mentioned in a majority of statutes.
See, e.g., Booth, supra note 36, at 126 ("Could it be that the only stakeholders who
have been targeted in this campaign to project responsibility are those who have
relatively little bargaining power and are being exploited by the stake itself?").
NONSHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
typical takeover situation, the best interests of nonshareholders such
as employee groups may be the continued independence of the cor-
poration, while the best interests of stockholders may be a sale or
liquidation.
6 1
Since the best interests of stakeholders have not been defined
per se,62 these statutes may represent an avenue for directors to
compensate stakeholders for losses incurred through decisions sup-
porting shareholder wealth maximization. It may indeed be possible
for directors to follow a path of shareholder wealth maximization if
entitlements have already been garnered and explicitly contracted
for stakeholders, ex ante to takeover situations. This point will be
further developed in Part III.
B. American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance
In its most recent tentative draft on corporate governance prin-
ciples, the American Law Institute ("ALI") has attempted to navigate
a narrow course between conflicting interests of shareholders and
stakeholders.6 3 Ultimately the draft supports the primacy of share-
holder interests. The ALI would allow directors to take actions that
have the "foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer"
unless the action materially disfavors the long-term interests of
shareholders. ' In order to determine whether such an action
61 Outside the legislative arena, several corporations have adopted charter
amendments which allow directors to consider stakeholders' interests when making
decisions related to a change of control. See Hanks, supra note 51, at 1228 (noting
that these charter amendments were the origin of non-stockholder constituency
statutes); see also Lipton, supra note 25, at 41 & n.188 ("For example, Control Data
Corp. and McDonald's have recently amended their charters in this fashion."). The
provisions allow, and in some cases require, that directors consider nonmonetary
factors when deciding upon a hostile tender offer, exchange offer, or business
combination. These nonmonetary factors often include the social and economic
effects of an acquisition on the target's employees, suppliers, customers, and others.
Unlike the statutory context, directors in these corporations have been given a basis
for decisionmaking that has been approved by the shai-eholders. This effectively
mitigates against any conflict that directors might encounter when making major
decisions because the shareholders have already approved a charter amendment
explicitly allowing the directors to consider "other interests." See 1 SHARK
REPELLANTS AND GOLDEN PARACHuTEs: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER 194-211
(R. Winter, M. Stumpf & G. Hawkins eds. 1983) [hereinafter SHARK REPELLATS]
(reprinting the provisions of Nortek, Inc., Control Data Corp., Central Bancshares of
the South, Inc., McDonald's Corp., and Anchor Hocking Corp.).
62 See Hanks, supra note 51, at 1229.
63 See Lipton, supra note 25, at 47-52.
64 See ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02(a) (Discussion Draft No. 2, April 20, 1989).
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"would materially disfavor the [shareholders'] long-term interests,"
the board of directors may consider,6 5 among other factors, 6 6 "the
impact on groups other than shareholders with respect to which the
corporation has a legitimate concern .... "67
In its comments, the ALI states that "[i]n looking to the long-
term interests of the shareholders, directors may consider the fact
that the long-term well-being of the shareholders requires stable
relationships with suppliers and customers and a cooperative rela-
tionship with the communities in which the corporation does busi-
ness."68 However, it is only when "competing courses of action have
comparable impact on shareholders [that] the board of directors may
consider in some degree other groups with respect to which the cor-
poration has a legitimate concern." 69 Thus, in comparison to the
states' nonshareholder constituency statutes, the ALI's draft pre-
serves little room for the consideration of nonshareholder groups in
directors' decisions.
70
C. Judicial Efforts
Although case law interpreting nonshareholder constituency
statutes appears to be nonexistent,71 in the past courts have recog-
65 The ALI additionally states that the board of directors "should consider the
nature, timing, and adequacy of the offer, the risk of nonconsummation of the offer,
and questions of legality .... Id.
66 Other specified factors include: "the past actions of the bidder and its
affiliates in other takeover contexts .... " Id.
67 Id.; see also id. at § 6.02(b) ("In reviewing an action of the board of directors
. . . the standard of review should be whether the board of directors reasonably
concluded that their action would not materially disfavor the long-term interests of
the shareholders.").
68 Id. at § 6.02 comment c(2).
69 Id. at comment a.
70 In fact, the ALI draft promotes the interests of shareholders in a similar
fashion to that found in recent Delaware case law. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) ("[W]hile
concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover
threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally
related benefit accruing to the stockholders."); Goldman & Walsh, Delaware Courts
Revisit Landmark Revlon, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 25, 1989, at S4, col. 1 (discussing the Unocal
and Revlon decisions).
71 This may, in part, be a product of corporate activity, or lack thereof, in the
states that have adopted the provisions. In addition, New York, a state with a high
amount of takeover activity, originally adopted a "watered down" nonshareholder
constituency statute which allowed directors to consider the "long-term interests" of
the corporation. Only very recently, New York amended its statute to enumerate
specific stakeholder groups. See supra notes 51 & 55-57 and accompanying text. See
generally Davis, Discretion of Corporat; Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder
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nized that directors may consider stakeholders' interests. Although
Delaware does not have a nonshareholder constituency statute on its
books, its courts have considered the issue in a series of cases. In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 the Delaware Supreme Court, in
upholding a target's self-tender that excluded a raider from partici-
pation, stated that a target's board of directors may consider "the
impact [of a hostile bid] on 'constituencies' other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the commu-
nity generally) ....
One year later, however, the Delaware Supreme Court held in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.74 that a target's
board of directors may not consider the interests of noteholders
after a decision has been made to sell the company. Once a sale of
the company had become inevitable, the directors' duty changed
from "defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders ...... "75 The court
did recognize that "[a] board may have regard for various constitu-
encies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are ration-
ally related benefits accruing to the stockholders." 76 Redistribution
of gains would not be a benefit accruing to stockholders. Thus, the
Delaware Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the primary objective
of directors conducting an auction must be to obtain the highest
price for shareholders and that consideration of the impact of a take-
over on corporate constituencies may be examined, "provided that it
bears some reasonable relationship to... basic stockholder interests
at stake.. . ." Examining the Unocal and Revlon decisions together,
it appears that directors may consider the interests of nonsharehold-
ers before an auction has begun, but any decision related to consid-
Gain-A Survey of and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 7, 20-48
(1988) (outlining various sources for managements' discretion to consider
nonshareholder interests, including the business judgment rule and enlightened self-
interest doctrine).
72 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
73 Id at 955.
74 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
75 Id at 182 ("[C]oncern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an
auction among active bidders is in progress .... "); see also Sussman & Sussman,
Litigation Intensifies on Duties of Target's Directors, Legal Times, May 26, 1986, at 10, col.
I ("The broader holding of the case.., was that Revlon Inc.'s directors breached
their fiduciary duties when they granted an asset lock-up to a white knight,
Forstmann Little & Co., which stymied a raid by Pantry Pride Enterprises Inc.").
76 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
77 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del.
1988); see, e.g., Goldman & Walsh, Delaware Courts Revisit Landmark Revlon, supra note
70, at S4, col. 1 (outlining the future impact of the MacMillan decision).
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eration of nonshareholders must result in some benefit to
stockholders, for it is to them that the target's board of directors
owes a primary duty of loyalty.7 8
A handful of decisions in other states have more strongly
defended the consideration of nonshareholder interests by direc-
tors.79 Herald Co. v. Seawell8 ° may be the most frequently cited
source of authority for support of directors' consideration of take-
over effects on stakeholders. 81 The Tenth Circuit held that the Den-
ver Post legitimately used defensive maneuvers against a hostile bid
by Samuel I. Newhouse, owner of one of the nation's largest newspa-
per chains and an owner with a history of labor difficulties. 82 In
78 See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1280, 1282 n.29.
79 See, e.g., Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (holding that "[i]t was proper for the company to consider the effects the Berry
tender offer would have, if successful, on the Company's employees, customers and
community. The Company concluded these effects would be detrimental to its
success.") (footnote omitted); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 689
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (asserting that management might consider the takeover concerns of
suppliers, customers, lenders, and the stability of the company when considering
takeover bids). In upholding defensive measures used by Union Carbide to avoid a
bust-up bid by GAF Corp.,Judge Pollack of the Southern District of New York stated:
A corporation with a perceived threat of dismemberment of large
divisions of the enterprise, employing thousands of employees, owes
substantial regard for their pension benefits, and in the case of loyal
management, severance benefits. . . . The exercise of independent,
honest business judgment... is the traditional and appropriate way to
deal fairly and even-handedly with both the protection of investors, on the
one hand, and the legitimate concerns and interests of employees and
management of a corporation who service the interests of investors, on
the other.
GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
80 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
81 See Sussman & Sussman, Takeover Cases Eye Non-Stockholder Interests, Legal
Times, Apr. 28, 1986, at 24, col. 2.
82 The Denver Post is a large newspaper with a long tradition of local ownership
through the Bonfils family. In May 1960, Samuel I. Newhouse purchased 18 percent
of the outstanding shares of the Post with an intent to acquire the entire newspaper.
OnJuly 7, 1960, the Post purchased about 21 percent of its outstanding stock held by
the Denver U.S. National Bank as trustee for the Children's Hospital Association.
For several years before the purchase the board of directors of the Post had
considered establishing an employee stock ownership plan. After the purchase of the
Children's Hospital shares the board implemented such a plan and transferred 5,000
treasury shares to the plan's trust. A member of the Bonfils family also donated a
number of shares to the trust. As of December 1969, 415 of the eligible 1159
employees had purchased shares from the trust. More than eight years after the
purchase of the Children's Hospital stock by the Post, Newhouse brought a derivative
action on behalf of the Post. The suit was against the Post's officers and directors for
alleged misconduct, breach oftrust, and misuse of assets. Newhouse claimed that the
board and trustee of the employee stock trust had conspired to acquire a sufficient
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response to the Post's concerns for its nonshareholder constituen-
cies, the court stated:
We are fully cognizant of the well established corporate rule of law
which places corporate officers and directors in the position of
fiduciaries for the stockholders.... In this case we have a corpora-
tion engaged chiefly in the publication of a large metropolitan
newspaper, whose obligation and duty is something more than the
making of corporate profits. Its obligation is threefold: to the
stockholders.... employees, and... public.
83
First amendment and free-press concerns aside, 4 it is important
to note that the court found that the Post's establishment of the
"Employees Stock Trust Plan" was legitimate, legal, and "clearly
within the power and authority granted by [state] statute to the cor-
poration"' and was not malevolently motivated.8 6 The Post's use of
the plan was to "benefit the public, the corporation and the
employees."
8 7
The directors of the Post desired to develop a plan which would
provide an opportunity for its employees to participate in stock own-
ership.88 In fact, the Post's directors personally investigated other
employee stock ownership plans at other newspapers. Apparently,
the directors sincerely believed that employee stock ownership
would promote a better employee-employer relationship. The direc-
tors also believed that employee stock ownership would eventually
lock control of the corporation in the employees and eliminate out-
sider control of stock.8 9 The court held that since the plan was
approved by a substantial majority of stockholders it would not
impose its business judgment on the directors. 90 In addition, the
motives for establishing the plan were found to be firmly grounded
in the Post's concern for its employees and their benefits, and not in
thwarting hostile advances by Newhouse. Furthermore, the plan had
been conceived well before any takeover events had developed.9 '
number of shares to vest control of the Post in the Bonfils family and employees
under its domination. See Herald, 472 F.2d at 1083-91.
83 Id at 1091.
84 The court stated that "[s]uch a newspaper is endowed with an important
public interest. It must adhere to the ethics of the great profession of journalism."
The court also described the newspaper as a "quasi-public institution." Il at 1095.
85 Id. at 1093.
86 See id. at 1092.
87 Id at 1095.
88 See id at 1084.
89 See id
90 See id. at 1096.
91 See id at 1095-97.
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The discussion by the Tenth Circuit of the Post's "Employees
Stock Trust Plan" may foreshadow the method in which courts will
examine directors' fiduciary responsibilities under nonshareholder
constituency statutes. By analyzing the Post's role in providing bene-
fits to workers, the court may have correctly focused upon the direc-
tors' attempts to aid or accommodate significant stakeholder
interests. 92 If a court was faced today with a nonshareholder constit-
uency statute, it might decide whether the directors had, through a
benefits program (contracting process), sufficiently considered
employees' (stakeholders') interests ex ante to a takeover and there-
fore satisfied their statutory responsibilities.
III. CONTRACTING WrIHouT ENTITLEMENTS
Stakeholders often interact with corporations on a continued
basis over a long period of time. Expectations are created between
stakeholders and corporations either through contracting processes
or through community interaction. For example: managers expect
compensation and security in employment; labor expects to sign,
and perhaps negotiate, contracts for employment; 93 suppliers and
buyers expect to contract for goods and services;94 bondholders
expect fixed returns for their investments;95 and local communities
expect jobs, adequate worldng conditions, and clean and safe envi-
rons.96 These expectations may be frustrated with a change of con-
92 The court specifically noted that the "Post's concern for their employees is
exemplified in all the employee benefits provided.... Indeed, approximately 11% of
the Post's total expenses go for these employee benefits." Id. at 1095. A more recent
evaluation of the validity of an employee stock ownership plan in a takeover context
can be found in Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch.
1989). The Chancery Court's examination of Polaroid's plan was in a slightly
different context than Herald, since Polaroid had approved and implemented a major
part of its plan in the midst of a takeover context. See infra notes 212-18 and
accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Raday, supra note 13, at 141 ("From the employee's perspective,
individual job security means that he has a right to his job .... "); Singer, supra note
13, at 728-29 ("While it is true that workers and managers will bargain around
compulsory contract terms, the resulting bargain will vary depending on their
relative bargaining power.").
94 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 13, at 719 (examining the impact of a plant closing
on supporting businesses).
95 See, e.g., McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413, 418
(1986) ("The potential for bondholder-stockholder conflict exists because
bondholders have prior but fixed claims on a firm's assets while stockholders have
limited liability for the firm's debt and unlimited claims on its remaining assets.").
96 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 71-73 ("[S]tate and local communities
frequently stand in the position of a creditor or partial surety for the corporation,").
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trol: new owners may attempt to renounce or renegotiate existing
agreements or contracts.97 The corporation or firm as "a nexus for a
set of contracting relationships among individuals""a may undergo a
vast transformation as a result of a hostile acquisition, attempted
acquisition, or restructuring. At least in the hostile takeover context,
the surviving corporation may be highly leveraged.99 Stakeholders,
who have sunk substantial investments into the corporation, may
face an uncertain future, 100 while shareholders are cashed out of
their ownership positions.
10 '
Shareholders might claim that they had supported the corpora-
tion as "residual claimants or residual risk bearers," since their
shares entitled them only to the "rights to net cash flows" from the
corporation.' 02 Under this contractual view of the corporation,
shareholders assume most of the risk of the corporation, while all
stakeholders who have a direct relationship with the firm supposedly
are protected through fixed contractual agreements.10 3 To maxi-
mize returns, however, the corporation must attempt to minimize
agency costs, which "include the costs of structuring, monitoring,
and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting inter-
ests."' 0 4 These agents are usually managers, employees, and credi-
tors. For example, managers are hired as agents of the corporation
to carry out "decision management and decision control."' 1 5 It is
97 See Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 491, 516-17.
98 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976).
99 See Upton, supra note 25, at 20-23.
100 For example, employees have often invested many years of service and
uncompensated time and labor in corporations and have less of an ability to leave
theirjobs. See Singer, supra note 13, at 715-17; Summers, supra note 16, at 170.
101 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 440 (noting that stakeholders "are exposed
... to shareholder opportunism").
102 See Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership & Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301,
302-03 (1983).
103 See id. at 302-03; Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1763-65 (1989).
104 Fama & Jensen, supra note 102, at 304. Fama and Jensen conclude: "In
complex organizations, the benefits of diffuse residual claims and the benefits of
separation of decision functions from residual risk bearing are generally greater than
the agency costs they generate, including the costs of mechanisms to separate the
management and control of decisions." Id at 309; cf. Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover
Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA.
L. REV. 1257, 1272-73 (1985) ("The system of corporate law provides a number of
formal institutional arrangements that also operate to reduce agency costs in large
corporations.").
105 Fama & Jensen, supra note 102, at 304-05.
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assumed that they do not bear the same magnitude of risk as share-
holders10 6 and are guaranteed a fixed rate of return (compensation)
through established contractual agreements. 10 7 Alternatively, in
return for bearing risk, "stockholders are not required to have any
other role in the organization, and their residual claims are freely
alienable."'
108
The problem with this analysis is that it assumes that stakehold-
ers do not share in any residual risk. 109 It is possible, though, that
stakeholders do share in substantial risks created through take-
overs. 1 ° Contracts that have been negotiated before the takeover
period frequently do not include contingencies for the negotiation of
additional risk-sharing among the parties should a takeover occur.
For example, employment contracts usually do not include consider-
ation for employees' expectations that exist as a result of their invest-
ment of human capital in corporations. 1 '
If a company has been purchased by a hostile raider, the original
shareholders have been cashed out of their holdings at a significant
premium. Employees, however, are left behind and are at the mercy
of the raider's plans for the future. Therefore, a takeover may result
in ex post losses to groups who hold contracts that do not account
for higher levels of risk or expectations." 2 Takeover attempts may
also have significant negative effects on employees. After a takeover
offer, a target company may restructure by becoming highly lever-
aged.' 1 3 Employees face new uncertainties of losing their jobs, as
106 See id. at 304.
107 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 12; cf Coase, The Nature of the Firm, reprinted in
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURrTIEs REGULATION 3, 4-5 (R. Posner & K.
Scott eds. 1980) (concluding that markets and firms are alternative forms of
contracting and that transaction costs determine how to choose between them). For
a listing of relevant works discussing the contractual economic theory of the firm, see
Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 1471, 1476 n.22 (1989).
108 Fama &Jensen, supra note 102, at 312.
109 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 12.
110 See id.
I See id at 74-75; Raday, supra note 13, at 148-49. In terms of plant closings,
one scholar notes, "In the real world, investors are often more secure than workers,
and they are secure because they shift many of the risks of investment onto workers
and communities by closing plants rather than by bearing the costs of creating
profitable and productive enterprises with those workers." Singer, supra note 13, at
728.
112 See Coffee, supra note 7, a. 72.
113 See L. SOLOMON, D. ScnwijTz &J. BAuMAN, supra note 2, at 1131.
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"[p]art of the plan is likely to call for sales of whole divisions... so
as to be able to service the new debt."
' "14
Nonshareholder constituency statutes may provide directors and
officers with a foundation in which to consider the problem of risk
borne by stakeholders after a takeover or restructuring. Directors
and officers might fashion certain explicit contracts which would pro-
tect stakeholders from the added risks created by changes of control
and capital structure. They might offer and negotiate these contracts
well before any takeovers are initiated. The contracts would offer
continuity of employment, bonding, or ownership rights agreements
and would represent a system of premium sharing, since they might
impact on the purchase price of the corporation." 5 Although the
price offered for the corporation with these agreements might be
lower in a takeover, the difference would lie in the value of the con-
tracts (which benefit employees). Once the contracts have been
made, thus entitling stakeholders to a "piece of the takeover action"
or a portion of the potential wealth gains or transfers, directors may
turn their attention to shareholder wealth maximization. 116 At that
point, their responsibilities under nonshareholder constituency stat-
utes would be satisfied.
IV. PROVIDING LABOR WrrH ExPLicrr CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION
Non-managerial employees constitute a significant stakeholder
group that experiences increased risk from hostile takeovers."
7
There have been many examples of corporations that have leveraged
their balance sheets as a takeover defense and subsequently dis-
missed or retired large portions of their workforce.' 8 Pension plans
114 Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 7, at 72 (noting that employee lay-offs often
occur after a corporate restructuring).
115 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 31, at 39-45 (outlining some of the costs of
antitakeover measures and their impact on the purchase price of corporations).
116 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (concluding that once it is apparent that the corporation is to be sold, the duty
of directors changes to auctioneers, charged with maximizing the price for the
stockholders).
117 This may also be the case for managerial workers. See, e.g., Halverson, First
the Merger, Then the Job Cut, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 4, 1989, at 9 ("The merger-
acquisition fervor of the past decade has led to some layoffs of workers . ..
particularly among professionals at the managerial level and among highly paid
skilled workers within the manufacturing sector.").
118 For example, Prime Computer Corp. avoided being taken over by MAI Basic
Four, Inc. by accepting a leveraged buyout by J.H. Whitney & Co. The buyout
resulted in burdening Prime Computer with over one billion dollars in debt and 150
million dollars in annual interest payments. By October, 1989, the Company
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have been terminated or excess funds from those plans have been
used to provide cash to leveraged corporations struggling to main-
tain liquidity." 9 Hostile purchasers or leveraged buyout firms often
consolidate, restructure, bust-up, or liquidate whole portions of cor-
porations, leading to plant closings' 20 and terminations of work-
ers.' 21 In addition, employees are usually members of local
announced that it would layoff approximately 2,500 employees (21 percent of its
total workforce). The Company stated that the firings were part of a company-wide
restructuring which would reduce its outstanding debt and cut significant costs. See
Edelman, Prime to Lay Off 2,500 More; State to Feel the Brunt, Boston Globe, Oct. 24,
1989, at 1, col. 2. In response to a hostile bid by Wickes Corporation in late 1986,
Owens-Coming reduced its pre-takeover bid workforce of 28,000 by approximately
13,000 workers as a result of increased leverage and restructuring. See Faludi,
Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits but Exacts A Heavy Human Toll-The '80s-Style Buy-Out Left
Some Employees Jobless, Stress-Ridden, Distraught, Wall St. J., May 16, 1990, at Al, col. 6;
O'Brien & Kline, An RxforJobs Los.! Through Mergers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, § 4, at
23, col. 2; see, e.g., Cummins Engine to Lay Off49 Production Workers In Indiana, McGraw-
Hill News, March 23, 1989; see also supra notes 12 & 39 and accompanying text
(arguing that takeovers and restructurings result in the elimination ofjobs).
119 On the issue of employment, pension plans, and takeovers, Senator
Proxmire recently stated:
Takeovers have led directly to the elimination ofjobs. AFL-CIO officials
estimate that takeovers have caused the loss of 80,000 union jobs. In the
aggregate, some 500,000 jobs have been lost.... American workers are
plundered even when they are not terminated. For example, some $16
billion has been siphoned from private pension plans. In many cases, the
plundered funds went to firms attempting to fend off a bidder, or even to
successful bidders.
Proxmire, supra note 39, at 360 (fbotnotes omitted); see also Coffee, supra note 7, at
70-71 & n.194 ("Over the last five years, employers have terminated more than 700
pension plans and collected $6.7 billion in 'surplus' assets; $3 billion was recaptured
in 1984, equal to the three previous years and thus showing a rising tide."); Williams,
Raking in Billions From the Company Pension Plan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at Fl, col. 2
("At an increasing pace, some of the most familiar names in corporate America...
have already withdrawn, or are trying to withdraw, $8 billion in surplus pension
money. They are diverting this money to other corporate uses, such as takeover
financing and capital investment ....").
120 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 13, at 614-620 (outlining some of the sources and
effects of plant closings).
121 See, e.g., A Freeze on the Frenzy, Newsday, Oct. 22, 1989, at 4 ("RJR Reynolds
Tobacco USA has cut its 15,000-person workforce by 2,340 since the takeover
[leveraged buyout by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.]. An additional 300, or 10
percent, were cut in RJR Nabisco's food operation, based in New Jersey."); Walker,
RJR Tobacco Unit to Eliminate 1,640Jobs in Restructuring, Reuter Bus. Report, Aug. 10,
1989 ("R.J. Reynolds said it would cut 1,640 salaried and hourly workers, reducing
its staff to around 12,500."); Hinden, Retired RJR Official Issues Warning on LBO; Debt is
Likely to Mean Layoffs, Cost-Cutting, House Panel Tol, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1989, at E2,
col. 4 ("Layoffs, reduced employee benefits and deep cost-cutting at RJR Nabisco
Inc. will be the bitter fruit of the $25 billion takeover by the investment firm of
[KKR], a retired RJR official predicted .... ); Regenstrelf, Campeau Says Shakeup of
Federated Is Complete, Reuter Bus. Report, June 30, 1988 ("Robert Campeau... fired
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communities (additional stakeholders) that may be affected by layoffs
or terminations.' 2 2 Although it may be argued that these develop-
ments generally represent corporate responses to increased eco-
nomic competition from abroad, 2 ' it does not answer the question,
"should workers be compensated for bearing higher levels of risk?"
Nonshareholder constituency statutes clearly indicate that the inter-
ests and expectations of workers should not be ignored. 124 Directors
and officers may acknowledge such expectations by offering to nego-
tiate explicit risk-sharing contracts with workers.
Directors and officers may be able to reduce the costs to labor of
employment termination by offering to negotiate contracts similar to
those used by many corporations. If the employees are mostly mem-
bers of labor unions the use of successorship clauses in collective
bargaining agreements may offer a source of group protection for
workers' interests in event of a change of control. If the employees
are not unionized, silver or tin parachute agreements might protect
workers. In either case, employee stock ownership plans, adopted
well in advance of any takeover activity, might greatly assist in reduc-
ing employees' added risks from takeovers.' 2 '
more than 3,600 Federated Department Stores Inc. workers since taking over the
firm in May ...."); Prokesch, People Trauma in Mergers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at
D I, col. 3, D5, col. I ("In an effort to slash overhead through [consolidation] ...
acquiring companies ... have discharged or pushed into early retirement tens of
thousands of people.").
122 See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Singer, supra note 13, at 718
(outlining the effects of plant closings on workers, their families, and communities).
123 This competition has, in turn, created the need for more efficient
management or pruning of surplus workers, redundant resources, and excess
capacity. This may be especially true in the oil industry takeovers of the early- to
mid-1980s. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 70 n.193 & 71.
124 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
125 No attempt will be made to distinguish between specific highly-regulated
and non-regulated industries. However, directors of corporations that are highly-
regulated by the federal government may face additional statutory and administrative
duties requiring them to consider protective agreements or contractual provisions
for workers who are adversely affected by mergers. For example:
[A] comprehensive system of governmental regulation in the
transportation industry has included as an incident far-reaching protective
provisions for employees adversely affected by mergers ... in the form of
severance pay in the event of dismissal, displacement allowances for
poorer jobs, moving and retraining allowances, and protection of
seniority.
Blumberg,-Collective Layoffs: Protection of Employees Against Dismissal or Displacement as a
Result of Mergers, Closings, or Work Transfers, 26 AM.J. COMP. L. 277, 284 (Supp. 1978).
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A. Successorship Clauses
Collective bargaining agreements may contain clauses which
make the contract binding on any successor or assignee. These
clauses purport to bind the successor or purchaser of a business to
the unexpired collective bargaining agreement of the predeces-
sor.12 6 Detailed provisions "may make the contract binding on the
company's successor in the event of a sale, transfer, merger, or other
change in the form of the business."' 2 7 During collective bargain-
ing, unions usually demand successorship clauses, while employers
generally oppose them. 2 ' Since the National Labor Relations
Board has held that successorship clauses constitute a mandatory
subject of bargaining,' 2 9 employers must seriously consider unions'
demands.
In several cases, the Supreme Court has considered the enforce-
ability of labor agreements on successor corporations. In NLRB v.
126 There are several different types of successorship clauses. The first, which
involves "boilerplate recitals" either in the preamble or final paragraph of the
agreement, simply states that the contract is binding on the parties and their
successors or assigns. The second type has been called an "evasion clause" since the
employer often promises not to transfer any operation or business "for the purpose
of defeating or evading the agreement." In the third type, the "explicit successorship
clause," "the employer expressly agrees to transfer the operation only to a purchaser
who will assume the labor contract." Estreicher, Successorship Obligations, in LABOR
LAW AND BusINEss CHANGE 63, 68 (S. Estreicher & D. Collins eds. 1988). References
to a successorship clause in this Comment are generally to the third type of clause.
127 Collective Bargaining Agreements Negotiations and Contracts (BNA) 70:181, at 141
(Sept. 10, 1987). For example, a successorship clause within a collective bargaining
agreements states:
Contract binding regardless of any change in geographical or otherwise, in location or
place of business of either party ...
This Agreement shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of
the parties hereto, and no provisions, terms or obligations herein
contained shall be affected, modified, altered or changed in any respect
whatsoever by the consolidation, merger, sale, transfer or assignment of
either party hereto, or affected, modified, altered or changed in any
respect whatsoever by any change of any kind of the ownership or
management of either party or by any [sic] change, geographical or
otherwise, in the location or place of business of either party hereto.
Id. at 142.
128 See Comment, Successorship Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1979
B.Y.U. L. REV. 99, 102.
129 See UMW (Lone Star Steel Co.), 231 N.L.R.B. 573, 575 (1977). Although
the NLRB held that successorship clauses are mandatory subjects, they did not
examine the "issues of whether a union may lawfully act to compel compliance with
such a provision or whether a successor employer would be bound by the terms of
such an agreement." Id. at 575 n.13.
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Burns International Security Services, Inc., "o the Supreme Court firmly
established that a successor is not bound by a predecessor corpora-
tion's labor agreements;' s 1 the case, however, did not involve a suc-
cessorship clause. In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit LocalJoint Executive
Board, 13 2 the Court was faced with a successorship clause in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and a change of control. The Court did
not "reach the question of whether the parties to a labor contract
could alter successorship liability via an express agreement."'
' 3 3
Instead, it found that the buyer was not required to arbitrate with the
union since there was no continuity of identity in the work force
hired by the buyer, compared to that of the seller, and in addition,
there was no express or implied assumption by the buyer of the arbi-
tration agreement.' The Court did explain that another remedy
might be available to the union: moving to enjoin the sale on the
grounds that it was a breach of the successorship clause in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement by the seller.'15 Applying the Burns and
Howard Johnson opinions together, circuit courts have held generally
that successorship clauses, of any form, cannot be enforced against
unwilling buyers.' 3 6 Thus, courts have held that successorship
clauses are not binding on successors without their consent to all of
the substantive terms and conditions of predecessors' collective bar-
gaining agreements. Courts have been consistent in applying con-
tract law, holding that a party cannot be bound by a contract to
which it did not consent.
1 3 7
Although successorship clauses may not be legally binding upon
buyers, they may achieve the same result by providing the union with
an opportunity to enforce the clauses upon sellers through injunctive
relief or damages. In Local Lodge No. 1266, International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp.,' 38 the Seventh Cir-
130 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
131 See id at 291.
132 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
133 Comment, The Unenforceable Successorship Clause: A Departure From National
Labor Policy, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1249, 1266 (1983) (footnote omitted).
134 See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264-65.
135 See id. at 258 n.3.
136 See, e.g., Bartenders and Culinary Workers Union, Local 340 v. Howard
Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160, 1162-63, (9th Cir. 1976) (refusing to enforce a
successorship clause against a successor who had retained the entire workforce of its
predecessor); Emerald Maintenance v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 1972)
(refusing to enforce a successorship clause against a successor who had hired a
majority of its employees from a predecessor's workforce).
137 See Comment, supra note 1.28, at 105.
138 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981).
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cuit held that a union was allowed injunctive relief to halt a proposed
sale of corporate assets. The injunction was granted pending arbi-
tration of the employer's right to sell the business without ensuring
adoption of the collective bargaining agreement, which included a
successorship clause, by the purchaser.' 39 The court found that "the
decision to sell the Sintered Specialties Division [of Panoramic Cor-
poration] threatened the Union and its members with irreparable
injury."' 141 Other courts have allowed damage remedies for breach
of successorship clauses. 
14 1
A union may gain injunctive relief only if it files a suit prior to
the consummation of the transaction. Therefore, the union must
know or be informed about the pending sale, restructuring, or liqui-
dation of the company in order to file a suit for injunctive relief.'
42
In most hostile takeover settings this will not be a problem, since
bidders publicly announce tender offers for the benefit of sharehold-
ers.1 43 The threat of injunction will cause the seller to require that
any acquiror satisfy the terras of any existing successorship clauses.
The seller will probably ask that any acquiror indemnify it against
any related suits under any such clauses. Therefore, the successor-
139 See id at 277, 279. The successorship clause at issue was contained in the
preamble to the collective bargaining agreement. The union (plaintiff) interpreted
the "successor and assigns" clause "as requiring Panoramic to secure from any
purchaser, as a condition of sale, an assumption of the obligations of the labor
agreement." Id. at 279. The court agreed with this interpretation.
140 Id. at 288. On the issue of harm to union employees and the possibility of a
damage (breach of contract) remedy, the court stated:
The proposed sale of Sintered Specialties Division would have resulted in
the immediate loss of employment by 113 Panoramic workers represented
by the Union. The purchaser ... has no duty to rehire these employees
and has expressed no specific desire to do so. Where, as here, employer
action threatens a permanent loss ofjobs, a damage remedy is inadequate.
Id. at 286. The Ninth Circuit is the only court to take a position counter to this
holding. It has indicated that "such injunctions will not issue in the absence of an
express clause obligating the employer to preserve the status quo pending arbitra-
tion, although it too has left open the possibility of an injunction for situations in
which the arbitrator will not be able effectively to restore the status quo." Estreicher,
supra note 126, at 70. Most courts, however, appear to be satisfied with a broad arbi-
tration clause and some type of successorship clause. Courts have been influenced
by the "prospect of permanent loss ofjobs by union members and the inability of the
arbitrator to fashion an effective remedy once confronted with the fait accompli of a
consummated assets sale and transfer of operations." Id.
141 See Fasman & Fischler, La,5or Relations Consequences of Mergers and Acquisitions,
13 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 14, 27 (1987) ("mhe success of any damage theory will
depend upon whether the contract clause imposes specific enforceable duties upon
the predecessor employer.") (footnote omitted).
142 See id.
143 See L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ &J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 1052.
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ship clause would appear to be a legitimate means of protecting
labor contracts after a takeover.
A board that has approved a successorship agreement has thus
accepted the fact that any future acquirors must be required to honor
collective bargaining agreements. The purchase price paid for the
corporation will reflect the cost of such contracts; the board will have
capitalized part of the corporation's labor costs into the corpora-
tion's acquisition price. This represents an entitlement to a stake-
holder group, negotiated in advance of an acquisition. If a hostile
bid is then made for the corporation, and if the directors have
already agreed to a successorship clause, labor's entitlements may
have been examined and accounted for as described in non-
shareholder constituency statutes. The board may then turn its
attention to shareholders' and other stakeholders' concerns.
B. Silver or Tin Parachutes
One form of explicit contracting in advance of a takeover that
has already been used by many corporations' 44 is the "golden para-
chute."'145 These contracts represent explicit agreements between
officers and corporations in which the corporation agrees to pay cer-
tain benefits in the event of a change in control. The agreements
provide a guarantee of the financial security of executives,1 46 since
144 See, e.g., Haims & Cagney, Guidelines for a Change of Control Audit, Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 25, 1989, at S2, col. I ("[I]n 1988, 41 of the top 100 industrial companies
provided change of control protection for one or more executives, compared with
only 12 five years earlier, and 55 percent of 242 U.S. industrial and financial
organizations provided golden parachute protection in 1988.") (footnotes omitted).
145 A typical golden parachute plan protects corporate officers in the event that
their employment is terminated on or subsequent to a change in control of the
corporation. Severance benefits are paid to an officer if the corporation terminates
the executive (other than for "cause") or if the officer "terminates his employment
because there have been specified actions short of termination taken with respect to
his employment, such as downgrading of position, a reduction in salary, a forced
relocation or a failure to maintain bonus or benefit plans." 2 SHAax REPELLANTS,
supra note 61, at 425. The term "golden parachute" is often used as a "pejorative
term for a contract, generally made only with senior management, that provides
substantial benefits if the executive leaves the employ of the target corporation, or at
least is forced to leave, after a change in control." L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ, &J.
BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 1061. Thus, it is thought that the generous benefits offered
by such plans provide a "safe landing" for corporate officers in the event of a
takeover. See 2 SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 61, at 425. However, no negative
connotations should be drawn from the use of the term in this Comment.
146 See Subcommittee on Executive Compensation, A Road Map for the Corporate
Advisor, 40 Bus. LAW. 219, 348-49 (1984). For an introduction to the mechanics of a
golden parachute agreement, see 2 SMHRK REPELLANTS, supra note 61, at 425-436.8.
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officers are exposed to significant risks in two areas: human capital
and deferred compensation. 147 Officers will not have incentives to
develop firm-specific skills or expertise if it is apparent that such
investments will be lost as a result of a takeover. In addition, they
will not be willing to defer compensation if there is an inherent risk
of termination or change of position. The corporation can compen-
sate managers for the risk of termination by either offering to pay a
risk premium or using "bonding devices, such as the 'golden para-
chute,' which compensates only those who are in fact terminated." 
148
The use of a bonding mechanism, if reasonably created, 149 may
protect the interests of managers throughout a takeover and offer
them incentives to maximize shareholders' value. In fact, the con-
tracts represent a means of eliminating the conflict of interest
between target management and shareholders with respect to a take-
over.' 50 Officers may thus be in a better position to bargain for risk-
For a list of commentators and bibliography of articles related to the validity and
enforceability of golden parachutes, see ia at 435 n.1.
147 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 74-75; Raday, supra note 13, at 149-50.
148 Coffee, supra note 7, at 74.
149 The Tax Reform Act of 1984 (and as amended by the Tax Reform Act of
1986) established statutory thresholds for parachute payments. The Internal
Revenue Service does not have authority to challenge the corporation's right to
contract for large parachute payments or the executive's right to receive them.
However, the Service may attack the ability of the corporation to take a tax deduction
on the payments. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (Supp. I 1984 & Supp. V 1987).
Section 280G of the Internal Revenue Code disallows corporate tax deductions for
"payments in excess of reasonable compensation for 'golden parachute' payments to
key employees upon a change of ownership or control .... An 'excess parachute
payment' is generally defined as a payment whose aggregate present value exceeds
three times the average annual compensation includible in the recipient's gross
income over the preceeding five-year period." M. GRAxrz, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 287 (2d ed. 1988). Congress enacted section 4999 of the Internal Revenue
in order to "impose a 20 percent excise tax on excess parachute payments." Id. In
addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission has required increased disclosure
of golden parachutes. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(e) (1989) (Item
402(e)); see, e.g., Haims & Cagney, Guidelines for a Change of Control Audit, Nat'l LJ.,
Sept. 25, 1989, at 52, col. 1 (outlining steps to be taken by independent directors in
creating a valid change of control provision and the current SEC rules). For
discussions of unusually large or excessive golden parachute agreements, see
Greenhouse, Golden Chutes Under Attack, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1985, at D2, col. 1;
Johnson & Morris, Beatrice Cos. Grants Golden Parachutes Totaling $23.5 Million to Six
Officials, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
150 See, e.g., R. GiLsON, supra note 41, at 670-71 ("Awarding management golden
parachutes adds a second asset to management's portfolio: the expectation of a large
termination payment which can be realized only if a takeover actually occurs. The
result, it is argued, is a portfolio the value of which is invariant to the risk of takeover.
As a result, management will consider a proposed offer solely from the perspective of
what is best for the shareholders .... ).
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bearing compensation than most other stakeholders. This does not
mean, though, that other employees should be left out of an
advanced contracting process.
The golden parachute might be extended to mid-level manage-
ment ("silver") or rank and file workers ("tin") in non-unionized
companies. These plans have also been called parachute agreements
and are designed to provide severance compensation to workers
after a hostile takeover."' The board of directors might develop a
parachute plan available to all full-time employees of the corpora-
tion, establishing a contractual right to the benefits under the plan.
Eligibility might hinge upon a minimum number of years an
employee has spent with the company and a change of control of the
corporation. Following a takeover, the eligible employee would be
entitled to a "parachute payment" if her employment is terminated
involuntarily. The amount of the payment might be correlated to the
number of years that the employee has been with the firm. The cor-
poration would require that any successor or assignee, through
purchase, merger, hostile acquisition, or otherwise, expressly and
unconditionally assume and agree to perform the corporation's obli-
gations under the plan.'
5 2
In general, courts have upheld the enforceability of golden para-
chute agreements, rejecting arguments that such agreements are a
waste of corporate assets or are not supported by adequate consider-
ation.1 53 For example, one court held that a golden parachute
agreement in question was enforceable since it was executed for the
151 See 2 SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 61, at 591. The introduction to a model
silver parachute agreement states:
Many employees have invested their lives in their jobs and have made
significant contributions to the growth and success of the Company. The
stress on the employees and their families caused by the uncertainties of
the pre-takeover contests and by the post-takeover threats resulting from
the change in control are widely recognized. Plant shutdowns, plant
relocations, different management ... and reduced employee benefits all
may flow from a hostile takeover, and all impose costs which must be
borne by the employee and the employee's family.
The Board of Directors recognizes that, after a hostile takeover of the
Company, it will no longer have the power to protect the interests of the
employees. The Board believes it is in the Company's interest to provide
employees with the right to compensation to assist them in bearing the
costs imposed by a hostile takeover.
Id.
152 See id. at 592-99. This Comment suggests that the silver or tin parachute
extend to situations involving non-hostile takeovers or perhaps even restructurings.
153 Litigation challenging golden parachute plans has been largely unsuccessful
on procedural grounds and on the merits. See id. at 436.1.
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purpose of protecting stockholders by inducing the corporation's
officers to remain at work during a time of uncertainty when they
might otherwise be distracted by concerns for their own financial
security.' 54 Another court rejected a waste of corporate assets claim
and upheld an agreement on the grounds that the severance com-
pensation provided to an executive was "comparable to severance
pay provided employees in other contexts."' 155 It appears, however,
that in order for a golden parachute to be enforced, its terms must
be related to the termination of an executive (or employee) and not
simply to a change in control. 156 In addition, two other factors may
influence a court's willingness to enforce a parachute agreement:
the approval of the agreement by a disinterested majority of the
board of directors or a board committee, and the approval by the
corporation's shareholders, after appropriate disclosure. 157 Unfor-
tunately, relatively few cases have involved the enforceability of
golden, silver, or tin parachutes, which increases the difficulty of pre-
dicting the outcome of specific agreements.' 5 8
In any event, silver or tin parachute plans represent a low-
cost' 59 means of wholesale contracting for employees' rights.
154 See Royal Crown Co. v. McMahon, 183 Ga. App. 543, 545-46, 359 S.E.2d
379, 381 (1987).
155 Ohio Court Reects Challenge to Bank Employee's "Golden Parachutes," 18 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1719, 1719 (1986).
156 See, e.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 233-35 (S.D.
Ohio), aff'd by summary ord., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987) (enjoining enforcement of an
amendment to a golden parachute agreement adopted in response to a takeover
threat, authorizing the corporate officer to terminate employment with the
corporation and receive severance pay solely on the basis of a change in control,
regardless of adverse actions with respect to his employment status).
157 See 2 SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 61, at 436.7; see, e.g., Ryan, Corporate
Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers-Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 3, 19 (1989) ("Typically, a tirt parachute plan is adopted by a board of directors'
resolution without the need for shareholder approval although it is possible for a
board to seek ratification of its decision to adopt a tin parachute.").
158 See 2 SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 61, at 435. According to one source:
[T]here is relatively little precedent to date on the merits [of
enforceability of parachute plans] because, in part, litigation which is
instituted in the context of a hostile takeover frequently does not result in
decisions on the merits and there are conflicts in the courts as to when it is
appropriate to examine the -merits of such agreements ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
159 See Ryan, supra note 157, at 19. Ryan notes that, for silver parachutes:
[L]egal drafting fees are low, at least when compared with other forms of
legal services. Further, no corporate monies need be expended to install
the plan because no payments are required until job actions follow a
hostile takeover. Finally, neither accounting guidelines nor government
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Although a plan would not represent an employment contract or a
job-status guarantee under a change of control, it would provide for
a contractual payout if an employee is terminated or moved to an
inferior position.' 60 The potential payout would have an impact on
the company's purchase price, representing a transfer of compensa-
tion from stockholders to employees.'
6 1
Herman Miller, a producer of office furniture in Michigan, was
the first corporation to adopt this type of plan. 62 All employees
with a minimum of two years of. service are eligible for at least one
year's pay if they are terminated, or experience reduced salaries,
benefits, or working conditions as a result of a takeover. Employees
who have been with the company for more than five years are eligible
to receive 2.5 times their total compensation for the previous year,
but not more than 2.99 percent of their average annual pay during
the preceding five years. At the time of the adoption of the plan,
Herman Miller's chairman stated that the corporation was not the
target of any takeover attempts.1
6 3
regulations require companies to establish a reserve account for
anticipated tin parachute payments.
Id (footnote omitted).
160 See 2 SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 61, at 597.
161 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 70, 104-05.
162 Herman Miller's plan was adopted in 1986. Since that time a number of
companies have adopted tin parachute plans. One scholar has recently conducted a
search for corporations that have adopted silver or tin parachute agreements. See
Ryan, supra note 157, at 10-11 n.17. He first requested a list from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center ("IRRC") of corporations which have adopted such
plans. The IRRC identified 19 corporations, including: Accuray Corp.; Amstrong
World Indust., Inc.; Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc.; Fireman's Fund Corp.; First Tenn.
Nat'l Corp.; W.W. Grainger, Inc.; Irving Bank Corp.; Lubrizol Corp.; Maxus Energy
Corp.; Mead Corp.; Mellon Bank Corp.; Herman Miller, Inc.; Mobil Corp.; Oneok,
Inc.; Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc.; Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc.; Polaroid
Corp.; San Diego Gas & Electric Co.; and Westvaco Corp. See id. Both Accuray and
Chesebrough-Ponds's were acquired through "friendly" takeovers. Irving Bank's tin
parachute was apparently used as a takeover defense against a hostile bid by the Bank
of New York. Ultimately, Irving Bank was acquired by the Bank of New York and "tin
parachute benefits [were] paid to discharged [Irving] employees, at the rate of one
month's salary for each year of employment, to a maximum of 24 months'
compensation." Id.
Ryan then examined the proxy statements of the companies on the IRRC list and
compiled a comprehensive appendix, comparing characteristics of the plans.
Interestingly, the majority of the plans were "linked to [a change] of control" and all
of the plans were adopted without shareholder approval. See id app. at 68-70.
163 See Herman Miller Adopts Company- Wide "Parachute, "Oct. 9, 1986, United Press
]Int'l Tape (Fin.); Silk, The Great Freedom of Corporate Life: To Question, Bus. MoNTH,
Apr. 1989, at 11; Lawrence, Why Golden Parachutes are Fool's Gold, L.A. Times, Oct. 26,
1986, § 5 (Bus.), at 1, col. 1.
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The Herman Miller p]lan represents a legitimate example of cor-
porate directors considering and accounting for significant stake-
holder interests. The directors adopted a specific arrangement to
compensate workers in the event that they become victims of a
restructuring or liquidation after a takeover.
C. Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs")
Non-managerial and mid-level managerial employees usually do
not own and cannot borrow enouglh financial resources to purchase a
meaningful amount of their corporation's stock."4 The leveraged or
non-leveraged employee stock ownership plan provides a means for
the "government to put ownership in the hands of people who could
not otherwise afford it or achieve it through most efforts of their
own."165 The federal government has created a means of encourag-
ing companies to establish employee equity ownership plans out of
retained earnings by offering either tax-advantaged credits or gen-
eral tax advantages.
1 6 6
An ESOP is a qualified stock bonus or stock purchase plan
offered by an employer to give or sell stock to employees through a
trust (often called an employee stock ownership trust, "ESOT") in
exchange for tax advantages. Qualifications and limitations on con-
tributions by employers to ESOPs are defined in the Internal Reve-
nue Code and Regulations1 67 and in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974.16' Employers' contributions to ESOPs
are usually tax deductible, and the value of the stock contributed is
164 SeeJ. BLASI, EMPLOYEE IOWNERSHIP-REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 117 (1988).
165 Id.
166 Tax-advantaged credits are available for the leveraged ESOP; general tax
advantages are available for the non-leveraged ESOP. See id
167 Since the late 1970s, over a dozen tax laws have been enacted which give
favorable treatment to and support the adoption of ESOPs. Two significant benefits
include the corporation's right to deduct both principal and interest on the loan in a
leveraged ESOP and the right to deduct ESOP contributions totalling 15 to 25
percent of the compensation paid to participants. See E. COHEN-ROSENTHAL & C.
BURTON, MUTUAL GAINS: A GUIDE TO UNION-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 252 (1987)
[hereinafter MUTUAL GAINS]. See generallyJ. BLASI, supra note 164, at 33-38 (listing the
significant public laws related to favorable tax treatment for ESOPs).
168 ESOPs are considered to be a type of pension plan. However, they are
exempt from many of the more restrictive and costly provisions of the Employment
Retirement Insurance Security Act ("ERISA"). For example, ESOPs are able to
invest primarily in the employer corporation's securities and thus are not limited to
the 10 percent limitation on other pension plans under ERISA. In addition, ESOPs
are not considered to be subject to the funding requirements of traditional pension
plans and are not covered by Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Insurance. See
MUTUAL GAINS, supra note 167, at 252-53.
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not included in the income of the employee until withdrawal."6 9
Under an ESOP, an employee may acquire stock without payment or
at a price lower than the market price.' 70 Upon termination or
retirement, an employee is entitled to receive any vested stock held
by the ESOT.
17 1
ESOPs are, in effect, statutory pension programs that invest in
employer stock and provide specific tax advantages to both employer
and employee.' 72 Over the past twenty years, Congress has con-
verted the ESOP from a retirement account benefit to a tool of cor-
porate finance.' 73  It has created the leveraged ESOP, which
facilitates worker ownership of entire corporations. A typical lever-
aged ESOP borrows money to purchase stock in the corporation.'
74
The corporation then promises to contribute to the ESOP so that the
loan will be paid off. While the loan is being paid off, stock is allo-
cated to participating employees according to a particular chosen
formula. The corporation is allowed to include all ESOP contribu-
tions as business expenses, writing off both the principal and interest
on the loan for tax purposes.'
75
In a leveraged employee buyout, the corporation borrows funds
from banks to purchase the outstanding shares; the leveraged ESOP
trust then exchanges a note for a proportion of the stock already
purchased. After the buyout, the corporation makes annual cash
pension contributions (from its earnings) to the trust; the trust then
169 SeeJ. BLAsi, supra note 164, at 53.
170 See Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues
Raised by ESOPS, TRASOPS, Stock Purchases and Co-Operatives, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 729,
732 n.l.
171 See id. See generally H. HENN, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 533 (1986) ("An ESOP
is a qualified plan designed to provide a retirement benefit and a stake in the
corporation for employees.").
172 In addition, ESOP financing may provide tax advantages to certain qualified
lenders. Under section 133 of the Internal Revenue Code, certain lenders (including
banks, insurance companies, and regulated investment companies) may exclude from
their gross income up to 50 percent of the interest received on a loan to an ESOP as
long as the proceeds of the loan are used to acquire qualifying securities of the
corporation. See I.R.C. § 133 (1986). This may allow lenders to reduce rates of
interest charged on ESOP loans, a further tax advantage. This advantage may be
eliminated by a recent budget bill, approved by both houses of Congress and
awaiting presidential approval. See Belford & Greenberg, New Bill Cuts Back Tax
Benefits of ESOPs in LBO Transactions, Nat'l LJ., Dec. 18, 1989, at 16, col. I (outlining
the effects of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (H.R. 3200 or
O.B.R.A. 1989) on ESOPs used in leveraged buyout transactions).
173 See Levin, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged
Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 95 YALE Lj. 148, 154 & n.24 (1985).
174 See MUTUAL GAINS, supra note 167, at 251.
175 See id
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returns the funds to the corporation to repay the outstanding ESOP
note; the corporation in turn repays to the banks the acquisition
debt. In sum, employees are able to "finance their acquisition of
company stock with funds borrowed by the corporation and repaid
with firm earnings that have been channelled through the trust as
pension contributions."' 76 Thus, it is apparent that Congress estab-
lished leveraged ESOPs in order to address perceived inequities in
the distribution of capital throughout the economy.1
77
Although Congress has provided a tax-subsidy framework for
ESOPs, it is up to the management of corporations to decide how
worker ownership will be made available, which workers will be eligi-
ble, how ownership will be allocated, the timing of rights of owner-
ship, and how ownership will be represented in the company.' 78 In
answering these questions, boards of directors and management
have the potential to offer ownership positions to significant
stakeholders.
In the leveraged ESOP, a company's "contribution is defined by
the annual debt obligation of the trust and the annual tax-deductible
maximum of 25 percent of the pay of ESOP participants."' 79 In an
alternative form of ESOP, a non-leveraged ESOP, the annual contri-
bution can be any amount "up to 15 percent of the participant's
pay.' 180 The non-leveraged ESOP allows a company to contribute
stock to the ESOP or give it cash to purchase the stock. Similar to
the leveraged ESOP, the stock is allocated to employees according to
176 Levin, supra note 173, at 155.
177 See id. at 158. Congress believed that eight benefits would result from the
expansion of worker ownership of capital:
1) new wealth and productivity for the economy, 2) a chance for workers
to accumulate a capital estate, 3) more jobs, 4) reduced fiscal strain, 5) a
principled foreign policy, 6) union-management cooperation, 7)
preservation of the marginal enterprise, and 8) expanded consumer
purchasing power to "irrigate the economy."
Id. (footnote omitted).
178 SeeJ. BLAsI, supra note 1-64, at 32.
179 Id. at 39.
180 Id.
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a specified formula.1 8 ' The corporation's contribution is a tax
deductible business expense.
18 2
In both the leveraged and non-leveraged plans, the government
requires that every corporation develop a stock allocation formula
that does not discriminate in favor of corporate officers, significant
shareholders of the corporation's stock, or "highly-compensated"
employees.18 3 In fact, however, most plans have allocated worker
equity according to salary differences.
184
Although assets may be allocated by formula to an employee's
ESOP account, a vesting schedule controls when they actually belong
to the employee. The vesting process creates incentives for employ-
ees to remain with the corporation. The process also governs the
amount of time "a corporation can use the worker's equity in its
business operations and when an employee actually controls... her
ownership."' 8 5 As in the allocation formula, the vesting process
must not be discriminatory. Under typical plans currently in effect,
employees begin to enjoy stock ownership vesting after five years of
continuous employment with a corporation.' 8 ' The federal govern-
ment will soon require that vesting be either 20 percent per year
181 A third type of plan, a tax-credit ESOP (sometimes termed a payroll-based
stock ownership plan, "PAYSOP") allowed an employer who contributed securities
(or cash to acquire securities) to a plan to qualify for credit against income tax
liability equal to a prescribed percentage of the aggregate compensation of all
employees under the plan. See Olson, supra note 170, at 773. These plans often
excluded over 30 to 40 percent of the corporation's employees from participation.
See J. BLASI, supra note 164, at 116. Benefits were required to vest immediately,
meaning that there could be no forfeitures, even if the employee left the company.
However, the workers' stock was required to stay in the trust for seven years. The
plans were not allowed to borrow money and were required to pass voting rights
through to participating employees. See MUTUAL GAINS, supra note 167, at 251. The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated these tax-credit ESOPs. SeeJ. BLASI, supra note
164, at 116.
182 SeeJ. BLAsi, supra note 164, at 116.
183 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
[Aln employee is considered highly compensated if he or she has a salary
in excess of $75,000, owns 5 percent or more of the employer company,
receives more than $50,000 in annual compensation and belongs to the
most highly paid group in the company (i.e., in the top 20 percent salary
range), or is an officer in the employer company. Highly compensated
employees must be identified in terms of the entire company not just a
line of business or operating unit.
Id at 47 (footnote omitted).
184 See id. at 48.
185 Id at 51-52.
186 On the length of time before vesting, "[o]ne study indicates that 97 percent
of ESOP companies begin vesting after five years of actual company service or less
... and complete it after ten years. Public companies tend to finish vesting earlier
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after three years of employment or 100 percent after five years. 8 7 If
an employee leaves before full vesting of his or her stock, any non-
vested assets will be forfeited and divided among other employees or
will be used to reduce corporate contributions to the ESOP.'8 8
In almost all cases, employees are 100 percent vested by the
time they retire. At that point, employees have total discretion to do
whatever they desire with their shares. However, in some plans, the
ESOP trustee has the right of first refusal on all shares an employee
owns in the event that she wishes to sell them. 8 9 Dividends are paid
on stock held by an ESOT and are either allocated to employees'
accounts or are passed through and paid directly to the participant in
cash.190
Voting rights in ESOP shares usually attach upon the allocation
of stock. In publicly-held corporations, 1 9 1 workers have the legal
right to vote their allocation of shares held by ESOPs. 192 Thus,
employees are able to gain fuller ownership rights to their shares as
they accumulate years of service and greater voting rights as they
gain allocation.' 93 Alternatively, unallocated shares are usually
voted by the ESOP trustee who is often chosen by management.
19 4
The voting of unallocated shares may take several different forms.
(7.7 years) than private companies (10.4 years). Company size does not affect these
patterns." Id. at 52.
187 This has been mandated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and will take effect
in 1989-1991. In addition, the new tax law mandates that companies begin paying
vested ESOP ownership benefits even if the employee leaves the firm for reasons
other than death, retirement, or disability. See id.
188 See id. at 51.
189 See MuruAL GAINS, supra note 167, at 252.
190 See id.
191 "The law requires this of any company with a class of securities that must be
registered under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (that is, any corporation
with assets of at least $1 million and 500 or more stockholders)." J. BLAsi, supra note
164, at 55. A federal law, effective December 31, 1979, requires that ESOPs in
privately-held firms pass-through voting rights to workers on major corporate issues
that state laws or corporate charters mandate must be decided by more than a
majority of the outstanding shares, including mergers, acquisitions, consolidations,
or sales of all the corporation's assets. See id The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changes
the voting rights test for ESOPs of privately-held employers. Under the Act, the
ESOP trustee is required to permit each participant to direct the vote of shares
allocated to his or her account wiih respect to a specified list of corporate matters
regardless of whether a majority vote is required by applicable corporate law. See
I.R.C. § 401 (Supp. 1989).
192 SeeJ. BLAsi, supra note 164, at 55.
193 See MrruAL GAINS, supra note 167, at 252.
194 "A recent study by the ESOP Association shows that a bank, trust company,
or officers of the firm itself serve as ESOP trustees in 95 percent of the cases." J.
BLASI, supra note 164, at 55.
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First, and in many cases, the corporation will provide that to the
extent that voting decisions are not passed through to participants,
they will be made by a committee composed of management. Sec-
ond, a corporation may allow unallocated shares to be voted in pro-
portion to the instructions given by the participants for voting
allocated shares. Finally, ESOPs may contain provisions that require
the trustee to be subject to the direction of a fiduciary who may
appoint an investment manager.1" 5 The investment manager will
then have discretion to vote unallocated shares. In any case, the
ESOP stock is voted on a one-share, one-vote basis.
196
ESOPs provide a means by which the corporation may help
employees "buy into" or hold a stake in its operations. If an ESOP is
fully functioning and has been in effect for a number of years, a sig-
nificant amount of stock may lie in employees' hands.' 7 If this is the
case, these stakeholders may hold the means of compensation in the
event of a takeover. If a hostile tender offer is launched for the cor-
poration, the value of employees' vested ESOP stock will appreciate
along with all other shares. Employees may also have a toehold in
the decisionmaking processes of the board, since they may be able to
vote a significant number of allocated shares. Their collective voting
power may help to sound a voice either for or against the transaction
and, if the corporation has a cumulative voting'9 requirement for
electing board directors, they may gain actual representation in the
boardroom.
Although the above description of ESOPs has been a rough sur-
vey at best, it is evident that they may play a significant role in pro-
viding employees with protection against risks associated with hostile
takeovers. If a plan can be created under governmental regulations
well in advance of any takeover events, it would seem apparent that
directors and management had considered the interests of employ-
ees and established a mechanism for compensation in the event of a
change of control. Since ESOPs enjoy a favorable tax treatment,
195 See id
196 See id.
197 See Rosen & Quarrey, How Well Is Employee Ownership Working?, 65 HAiv. Bus.
REv. 126, 128 (1987).
198 Cumulative voting "is designed to allow shareholder groups to elect
directors in rough proportion to the shares held by each group and thus to guarantee
minority representation on the board.... [E]ach share... carries a number of votes
equal to the number of directors to be elected, but a shareholder may 'cumulate' his
votes." L. SOLOMON, D. ScHwARTz &J. BAUMAN, supra note 2, at 299. "Seventeen
states currently mandate cumulative voting, and about thirty states permit it." Id at
1364.
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their adoption should face little if any resistance among employees
and shareholders.1 99
In order for an ESOP plan to represent a successful application
of nonshareholder constituency statutes, however, it must not func-
tion as a substitute for existing wages and benefits. 20 0 The ESOP
must function as a method of transferring ownership to employees in
exchange for governmental tax advantages 20 1 and as a tool for rais-
ing motivation and productivity20 2 in the workplace. If the ESOP has
been adopted at the price of reduced compensation or the elimina-
tion of a pension plan, it will simply represent a re-mixing of employ-
ees' compensation and not an added security or protection plan. As
a result of the availability of tax advantages to corporations and lend-
ers to leveraged plans, explicit ESOPs may be established which
assist employees in becoming stock owners, provide them with
added compensation, and allow them to share in the premiums from
takeovers realized only by shareholders.
20 3
This system of explicit contracting differs from the successor-
ship clause and silver parachute agreements since it involves owner-
ship and the potential for control. However, if a hostile takeover is
199 But see J. BLASI, supra note 164, at 45 (stating that "[s]ome observers have
suggested that trade unions want to rely on contracts to control all forms of
compensation benefitting their members and hence are suspicious of employee-
ownership plans that tie a worker's capital accumulation to decisions by management
and/or the performance of the firm").
200 Some corporate ESOPs have been adopted either as alternative
compensation plans or in exchange for wage and benefit concessions by workers.
For example, Polaroid Corporation required that workers exchange a combination of
wage cuts, profit-sharing reductions, and pay scale decreases, totalling 36 million
dollars, for the implementation of an ESOP plan. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 27[ (Del. Ch. 1989); I.M. (Mac) Booth of Polaroid-The
ESOP Solution, INST. INVESTOR, Sept. 1989, at 87-88 (interviewing Polaroid's CEO on
its ESOP). In 1982, "Pan Am employees gave up 10 percent of their wages for a
nonleveraged ESOP and one seat on the board of directors." MUTUAL GAINS, supra
note 167, at 254; see also Olson, supra note 170, at 775-80 (describing the Pan Am and
Chrysler Corp. ESOP arrangements).
201 In 1983, for example, the National Center for Employee Ownership
determined that 40 percent of all ESOPs had been established primarily for tax
purposes. See MUTUAL GAINS, supia note 167, at 254. Taxpayers may be paying for
benefits received by these plans. See id. In addition, stockholders may also pay for
the establishment of these plans as a result of dilution if new shares are issued to the
ESOP. See id.
202 See Rosen & Quarrey, supra note 197, at 127-28 (comparing the performance
of ESOP companies with other similar companies and concluding that "[t]he data
couldn't be clearer: companies do better. . . after setting up ESOPs" as a result of
increased worker participation and motivation); see also Polaroid, 559 A.2d at 274
("[T]he evidence is uncontradicted that ESOPs promote productivity.").
203 See MUTUAL GAINS, supra note 167, at 253-54.
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successful, employees' ability to realize the appreciation of their
vested ESOP stock upon termination could be a surrogate for any
compensation that might have been provided through parachute
plans. It may be the case, though, that a combination of an ESOP,
parachute plan, or successorship clause will best protect the interests
of, or reduce the added risks experienced by, workers in a hostile
takeover.2 o4
V. PROBLEMS OF MANAGERIALISM
A critique of the proposed use of explicit contracts by directors
and officers might begin by claiming that it will foster managerial
entrenchment. The argument would follow that the use of explicit
contracts in the name of supporting nonshareholder constituency
statutes might further the goals of incumbent managements of cor-
porations which are potential takeover targets. Furthermore, if man-
agers are able to encumber the corporation with enough unwieldy
contracts, the corporation might become unattractive to potential
bidders and thus harm shareholders' interests, while allowing execu-
tives to retain theirjobs. Ultimately, the explicit contracting process
might be seen as a method of providing management with a mul-
tifaceted, super-corporate defense.
20 5
This critique, however, side-steps an important condition of the
proposed explicit contracts: all of these contracts have been used by
corporations in non-takeover settings. For example, ESOPs have
been widely used by corporations for many years.20 6 Legislative and
judicial standards have been put into place which limit directors' and
officers' abilities to abuse these forms of contracts.207 In the ESOP
context, tax reform laws have set specific guidelines for the level of
benefits and compensation available under the plans. 20 8 Tax laws
have also been used to place a reasonable limit on the amount of
compensation paid out under parachute agreements.20 9
In addition to the fact that the proposed contracts are often
adopted in the ordinary course of business, another significant con-
204 But see Coffee, supra note 7, at 76 (concluding that ESOPs may cause
employees to become "overinvested" in their corporation and thereby increase their
risk by becoming nondiversified residual risk bearers).
205 See supra note 41.
206 See Olson, supra note 170, at 742-80 (presenting case studies of ESOPs over
the years).
207 See supra notes 149 & 183 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 167, 172, 181, 183 & 191 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 149.
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dition relates to their ex ante adoption. It is not proposed that these
explicit contracts be adopted in the heat of a takeover battle, but
rather, that they be adopted well in advance of any major market
activity. Courts have indeed been reluctant to uphold ESOPs that
have been adopted solely as a response to a hostile tender offer, thus
solidifying control of the company in management's hands, instead
of for the benefit of employees.2 1 ° The sale of stock to an ESOP
during a takeover battle will be closely scrutinized by the court to
determine whether the board's actions were in good faith and were
reasonably related to the threat posed to shareholder interests by the
hostile bid.
2 1 1
210 As an example, in the early 1980s, Norlin Corporation was the subject of a
takeover bid; it commenced defensive action by issuing new voting stock to a wholly-
owned subsidiary and to a newly-established ESOP. The board of directors held
control of the voting rights of the newly issued shares and thereby diluted the voting
power of the bidders. The Second Circuit sustained an injunction against the stock
issuances. On the terms of the ESOP, the court held that in the context of takeovers,
an analysis of the directors' actions begins with the business judgment rule; however,
"[o]nce self-dealing or bad faith is demonstrated, the duty of loyalty supersedes the
duty of care, and the burden shifts to the directors to 'prove that the transaction was
fair and reasonable to the corporation.'" Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omittted). The court found that the
evidence supported a finding of selF-dealing by the board of directors; the timing of
the stock issuance to the ESOP indicated that it was for the purpose of solidifying
control of the corporation and not for the employees' benefit. The court held that
"the ESOP was created solely as a tool of management self-perpetuation." Id at 266
(footnote omitted).
211 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984);
Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd by sum. ord, 815
F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987); British Printing & Communications Corp. v. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC
Indus., Inc., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1.985). The court in Buckhorn provided a clear
summary on the issue of scrutiny:
[W]hile it is certainly permissible for the directors to adopt measures for
the benefit of its employees during the midst of a corporate control
struggle, the directors must show that "there are rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders" from adopting such measures.
Furthermore, the Court believes that it is appropriate to look at such
factors as "the timing of the ESOP's establishment, the financial impact
upon the company, the identity of the trustees and the voting control of
the ESOP shares" in determining whether the ESOP was created to
benefit the employees and not simply to further entrench management.
Buckhorn, 656 F. Supp. at 231-32 (footnotes omitted); cf British Printing & Communi-
cations Corp. v. Harcourt BraceJovanovich, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich proposed to issue new stock to an existing ESOP as part
of a defensive recapitalization. The -district court upheld Harcourt Brace's claim that
its contribution to the ESOP was necessary to provide employees with an incentive
for increased productivity to assist in the recapitalization. The court found that a
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If directors' actions in adopting an ESOP during an attempted
takeover were found not to be reasonably related to the threat posed
or disinterested, the court might next examine the overall fairness of
the ESOP to the corporation and its shareholders. Using this type of
examination, the Delaware Chancery court upheld the validity of an
ESOP adopted by Polaroid Corporation in the face of a hostile acqui-
sition bid by Shamrock Holdings. 212 The court concluded that the
corporation's directors were found to have been inadequately
informed during a special board meeting in which the ESOP was
considered and the directors failed to "take any investigation as to
the nature of the purported threat and... failed to evaluate whether
the ESOP constituted a reasonable response to the 'threat.' "211
Therefore, the court did not apply the business judgment rule and
instead scrutinized the adoption of the ESOP under a test of total
fairness.2 4 Although the ESOP was found to have some dilutive
effect on the holdings of other stockholders, the court found it to be
"fundamentally fair."121' The ESOP's fairness rested upon the
court's conclusion that the plan was indeed "shareholder neu-
pass-through voting provision for the shares held by the ESOP, in which shares allo-
cated to participants would be voted by them and unallocated shares would be voted
proportionately with the directed votes of the unallocated shares, sufficiently avoided
any problems of managerial entrenchment. See id. at 1531.
212 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch.
1989). Polaroid's board of directors initially considered adopting a comprehensive
ESOP in 1985 and subsequently adopted such a plan in early 1988. By mid-1988,
Shamrock Holdings began to acquire Polaroid's common stock in order to facilitate
an acquisition. At this point, Polaroid's directors began to consider expanding or
broadening the company's ESOP. See id at 265. In response to acquisition overtures
by Shamrock, Polaroid directors held a special meeting in which they considered a
"comprehensive plan" of defense against the "hostile" bid by Shamrock. This plan
consisted of four elements, including: the reorganization of Polaroid's businesses;
the use of voluntary and early retirement plans to reduce the work force; the ESOP;
and a decision to begin production of 35 millimeter film. The directors unanimously
approved the implementation of a broadened, 300 million dollar ESOP. The
amended plan called for a number of employee wage and benefit concessions in
order to help assure "shareholder neutrality"-whereby shareholders would not
directly pay for the ESOP. See id. at 271-72; supra note 200 and accompanying text.
Soon thereafter, Polaroid refused to meet with representatives from Shamrock.
Shamrock instituted injunctive action, claiming that "Polaroid's directors breached
their fiduciary duties in adopting [the ESOP] and.., breached certain promises to
Shamrock in connection with a meeting scheduled [to take place the day after
Polaroid's special board meeting]." Polaroid, 559 A.2d at 259.
213 Id at 270.
214 See id. at 271.
215 See id. at 275.
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tral,''216 "structurally fair in its voting and tendering provisions," '2 17
and not an unreasonable anti-takeover measure.
21 8
The Polaroid opinion places the concept of "shareholder neutral-
ity" as an important element in determining the overall fairness and
validity of an ESOP adopted in a takeover setting. It may be quite
difficult, however, to unify this concept with the goals of non-
shareholder constituency statutes. In order to provide labor with
significant contractual protection against takeovers, it may not be
helpful for a corporation to create an ESOP based on significant
wage concessions or benefit reductions. Thus, under non-
shareholder constituency statutes, corporations should attempt to
balance the long-term tax advantages of ESOPs and the building of
employee motivation and productivity with shareholders' interests in
avoiding dilution of their investments. This may be accomplished if
the ESOP plan is adopted before the company becomes the subject
of a takeover attempt and if the plan has been in effect for a number
of years.
2 19
Courts may also be reluctant to uphold golden parachute agree-
ments that were adopted in the heat of a hostile takeover attempt.
2 20
Similar to the ESOP case, boards of directors should consider adopt-
ing silver or tin parachutes well in advance of any takeover activ-
ity. 2 2 1 This would allow the boards to consider fully the issues
surrounding such contracts, including reasonable levels of compen-
sation. The directors' consideration of compensation afforded by an
agreement should be guided by tax law limits and the corporate
waste doctrine.22 2 The contracts are more likely to be enforced if
they have been approved by a disinterested majority of the board of
directors or a board committee, further limiting incentives for mana-
216 The court concluded that "shareholder neutrality" would be achieved by the
fact that although the issuance of ESOP shares might dilute shareholders'
investments, the ESOP required substantial wage concessions (give-ups) by workers
totalling 36 million dollars, and the plan would promote productivity in the
workplace and therefore increase corporate earnings. The net effect on the value of
existing shareholders' investments in the corporation would most likely be "neutral."
See id.
217 Id.
218 See id. at 274.
219 This would allow the corporation to benefit from the cumulative effects of
tax incentives and increased worker productivity and to avoid the need to extract
wage concessions from employees. See Rosen & Quarrey, supra note 197, at 127.
220 See 2 SHARK REPELLANTS, upra note 61, at 436.7-436.8; supra note 149 and
accompanying text.
221 See 2 SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 61, at 436.8.
222 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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gerial entrenchment. 228 Finally, depending upon the relative size of
the corporation or scope of the silver or tin parachute, the agree-
ment may only have a minor effect upon the purchase price of the
company. If the acquiring company chooses to retain most of the
workers covered by such an agreement, it may result in little, if any,
costs or payments.
2 24
Successorship clauses, silver or tin parachutes, and ESOPs will
not become additional corporate defenses if they are used reason-
ably and in advance of any takeover activity. It is important that
directors and officers seriously consider and act upon employees'
interests ex ante to major corporate decisions. If this is achieved,
explicit contracts will be put into place which will subsequently
accommodate these interests during a change of control or major
corporate decision.
CONCLUSION
This Comment proposes a basic solution to interpreting the
responsibilities of corporate directors and officers to employees
under state nonshareholder constituency statutes. By negotiating
over or providing labor with contractual risk protection ex ante to a
takeover, directors establish that they have considered the stakehold-
ers and their concerns. These contracts may take the form of agree-
ments which either attempt to secure employment of unionized
employees after the takeover (or else provide the workers with dam-
ages), to pay a lump-sum severance amount to employees upon ter-
mination, or to compensate employees with equity which may be
cashed out with a takeover. Each agreement is a form of premium
sharing, impacting upon the future purchase price of the corpora-
tion. Thus, in a takeover, shareholders will only realize a gain net of
the value of the contractual arrangements with employees.
Although all of these arrangements are currently in use in major
corporations, it may be incumbent upon directors and officers to
examine their relative compensatory impact on workers upon a
change of control. If, for example, it is determined that a corpora-
tion's current ESOP is too new to have a relative impact upon
employees' level of ownership of stock, directors may need to use
other explicit contracts in order to compensate or protect workers.
Employees represent a significant group to be accounted for
223 See 2 SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 61, at 436.7; supra text accompanying
note 157.
224 See 2 SHARK REPEL.AWS, supra note 61, at 436.7-436.8.
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under nonshareholder constituency statutes; however, there are
other interested stakeholders as well.22 In the context of employ-
ees, there are a number of explicit contracts that already exist which
might protect their interests after a change of control. This may not
be the case for other constituencies, especially those who do not
have any contractual relationship with corporations, such as local
rommunities. For example, if workers are laid off and plants are
closed in the "aftermath of either a takeover or a defensive tactic that
increases corporate leverage, much of the resulting costs will fall on
the state, which typically will be required to pay increased welfare
benefits and make other transfer payments." 22 6 Furthermore, local
communities often create firm-specific investments, such as schools
and social services, that may be lost or diminished without a major
plant or corporate headquarters.
22 7
It may be possible, however, for states and local communities to
contract explicitly with corporations in order to protect their firm-
specific capital. The community could offer to provide social serv-
ices related to the corporation or its employees in return for explicit
guarantees.22' These guarantees might take the form of severance
or relocation cost agreements that the target corporation would
include in any takeover agreement.
2 29
Implicit in the foregoing proposals is the fundamental assump-
tion that corporate governance is circumscribed by the states. The
Supreme Court has continuously emphasized that the states have the
225 See supra notes 11 & 111 and accompanying text.
226 Coffee, supra note 7, at 72.
227 See Singer, supra note 13, at 718.
228 See, e.g., Jones, Plant Closings: The Business View, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 419, 421-22
(1988) (examining services that might be provided in the event of a plant closing or
shut-down).
229 According to Professor Coffee, local communities tend to be " 'novices'
matched against a 'repeat player' [corporation) who sees that it is in a 'buyers market'
full of communities eager to attract such employers. This trend is increasing as small
towns now bid for major industrial plants by offering to install special improvements
and to develop a surrounding infrastructure of schools and other social services."
Coffee, supra note 7, at 72 n.199; see also Ansberry & Sasaki, Ohio Town Gives Look at
Future for Site of GM's New Saturn Plant, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1985, at 17, col. 4.
(discussing the impact a Honda plant had on a small community and what types of
arrangements were guaranteed in order to attract the company). Despite these
concerns, nonshareholder constituency statutes provide a forum for beginning
negotiations over community contracts with the corporation. If corporate directors
can demonstrate that they have negotiated and approved community-oriented
contracts that will survive a takeover or restructuring, they may legitimately focus on
shareholder (and other stakeholders') interests when making decisions.
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authority to define their own rules for corporate governance. 230
Thus, the states have discretion to define the relationships of stake-
holders to the corporation; for example, a state could legitimately
assign employees (or all stakeholders) voting rights.23' Although
nonshareholder constituency statutes do not quite change the bal-
ance of power between shareholders and stakeholders, they open the
blinds on the windows of the boardroom and allow directors to see
and consider the interests of affected groups surrounding the
corporation.
If the directors are in the midst of a hostile takeover, however,
the windows may be steamed up as a result of the mounting tension.
If stakeholder interests have already been accounted for (on clearer
days) through settled contracts, the directors may more comfortably
focus on the shareholders' desires.
230 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977). See generally
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (noting that "[t]he
Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic
theory").
231 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 461.
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